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Abstract 
This thesis is an attempt to articulate the ambiguity of the Hegel-Schelling 
relationship in Slavoj Zizek's work and gesture towards some critical problems it raises. 
Characterizing his own transcendental materialism again and again as Hegelian, never 
a Schellingian project, Zizek belies his overt reliance on texts such as Schelling's 
Philosophical Investigations into the Essence if Human Freedom and the Ages of the World for the 
development of his own theory of the psychoanalytical subject. What I propose, 
therefore, is to read Ziiek against Zizek in order to demonstrate the complex in twining 
of Schellingian ontology and Hegelian logic at the core of Ziiek's own thinking. 
Ziiek turns to German Idealist tradition in order to give a nonreductive 
materialist account of the emergence of the psychoanalytical subject. In the end, 
however; his reactualization of German Idealism intensifies the conceptual paradoxes 
underlying Lacanian psychoanalysis, rather them solving them. Zizek's fusion of 
Schelling and Hegel points to a possibly fatal ambivalence in Lacan's conception of 
the Real: Is it that which precedes and exceeds consciousness, or a pure lack that only 
represents itself through the breakdowns of the Symbolic? I will argue that Zizek's 
hybridism of Schelling and Hegel is unable to resolve this issue and thus calls us to 
return to German Idealism to understand what is truly at stake in the Schelling-Hegel 
conflict. 
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Introduction 
The following is an attempt to articulate the ambiguity of the H egel-Schelling 
relation in Slavoj Zizek's work and gesture towards some critical problems that it raises. 
Because this thesis is an investigation into Zizek's ontology, it does not specifically 
concern itself with German Idealism qua German Idealism. By immersing itself 
within the concerns that drive Zizek's philosophy, it withholds evaluative judgement of 
the fidelity of Zizek's reading of Kant, Hegel and Schelling and does not question 
Zizek's definitions of key concepts involved. Recognizing the continuing difficulty that 
this presents throughout the entirety of thesis, the author would like to suggest that its 
limitation has a specific theoretical function and strength: by arguing for a possible 
unstable hybridism of Schelling and Hegel within Zizek's ontology through his reading 
of the tradition, one of its goals is a call for a return to German Idealism in order to 
solve various problems that Zizek sees haunting the contemporary account of 
subjectivity. Therefore, even though this thesis must often depart from a strict intra-
textual analysis of key Zizekian texts in order to deal with extrinsic arguments and 
traditions, by being an examination of the coherence of Zizek's argument it is 
principally situated within the field of Zizek studies. 
Characterizing his own transcendental materialism again and again as an 
Hegelian project, Zizek belies his overt reliance on texts such as the Philosophical 
Investigations into the Essence qf Human Freedom (which, for short, I will refer to from now 
on as Freiheitsschrifl, German for "Freedom Essay") and the Ages qf the J#Jrld (or, in 
German, Weltalter) for the development of a metapsychological account of the 
ontogenesis of the subject. What I propose, therefore, is to read Zizek against Zizek in 
order to show that his philosophy is actually a hybrid of Schellingian ontology and 
Hegelian logic. What I aim to demonstrate is how this mixture of two radically 
opposed thinkers shows that Zizek reads them both mutually through one another in 
terms of what he takes to be the Grundlogik (fundamental logic) of the German Idealist 
tradition, while also revealing how this appropriation of the two thinkers brings to the 
fore an irrevocable tension in the Lacanian notion of the Real, an uncertain oscillation 
between an idealist structuralist metapsychology and a purely materialistic description 
of the subject rising out of nature. 
In the preceding paragraph, I have referred to Zizek's philosophy as a form of 
transcendental materialism, but the choice of this designation deserves to be prefaced 
insofar as he characterizes his parallax ontology as "the necessary step in the 
rehabilitation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism" (PV 4). This characterization 
is, however, problematic. Not only does it consciously try to make his own form of 
materialism approach that of Marx's without drawing the necessary distinctions 
between them, it also completely fails to articulate the essentially paradoxical and 
radically new manner by which understands the materialism-idealism debate 
Therefore, I adopt throughout the thesis Adrian johnston's characterization of Zizek's 
thinking of the subject as a form of transcendental materialism, an attempt to give a 
materialist foundation to a transcendental idealist subject for two reasons. Firstly, this 
has the benefit by its mere terminology to allow the reader to have an intuition of 
what is at stake in Zizek's ontology. Whereas dialectical materialism views the mind-
body relationship as grounded within the dialectical interpenetration and harmonious 
unity of the two as an identity within difference, transcendental materialism, by 
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focusing on the ontogenetic, metaphysical conditions of the possibility of the 
emergence of the transcendental subject already points to immanent genesis of an 
irreducible "gap" between mind and body that renders possible the reflexivity of self-
standing subjectivity. 1 Secondly, it allows me to do homage to Johnston's remarkable 
book. 
Ziiek's work on German Idealism is an attempt to investigate the foundational 
core of the Lacanian subject and its philosophical implications. Within Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, there is a constitutive, conflictual relationship between mind and body, 
which is the condition of the possibility not only of human experience, but also 
freedom and psychopathology. The human being is defined by the Todestrieb (death-
drive) as a kind of ontological "short circuit" that disrupts man's complete immersion 
in nature, separating the Innenwelt and Aussenwelt (inner world and outer world) thereby 
making it so they can never can positively meet. In this sense, Lacan's subject is strictly 
speaking abiological insofar as it is dominated by "non-natural" influences. This has two 
effects. Firstly, because Lacan's self-given task is to formulate the structures which 
constitute human subjectivity, his philosophy appears as a retour to the modern 
transcendentalism of the cogito. The Lacanian subject is haunted by similar problems 
such as subjective idealism (no contact with the extraconscious alterity of the world) 
and the uncertainty of mind-body relation. Secondly, Lacan left unanswered how 
extrasubjective reality could cause the generation of these quasi-transcendental 
structures which constitute the symbolic, human universe, with the concomitant 
problem of how we relate to this X which precedes our emergence into the world of 
For Johnston's justification of the term transcendental materialism to describe Zizek's ontology in 
relation to philosophical paradigms see ZO 273-274. 
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language. Seeing a structural identity with the theoretical concerns of the immediate 
philosophical reactions to Kant, Zizek reads the fundamental concepts of 
psychoanalysis through German Idealism. 
Yet, what Zizek claims he finds in the tradition is more than theoretical 
material which he can use in order to develop a materialist metaphysics which is able 
to contain the Lacanian subject within an overarching ontology. He attempts to 
illustrate the uncanny identity that exists between the psychoanalytical subject, 
haunted by the Todestrieb as the constitutive basis of its existence, and the operative 
logic of German Idealism. By falling upon premonitions of the psychoanalytical 
experience in concepts such as Kantian unruliness, the Hegelian "night of the world" 
and the Schellingian notion of the Grund (ground, in the double sense of reason or 
foundation and that upon which one stands), Zizek interprets the post-Kantian 
attempts to give an ontogenetic account of the free "I" through the Lacanian subject. 
As the fundamental presupposition of Zizek's philosophy, the Lacanian subject 
is to be radically distinguished from the philosophical subject of modernity. Although 
the former demonstrates many traits which link it to transcendental idealism (it 
grounds the symbolic structures which constitute the unity of experience through a 
spontaneous and free synthetic idealization), it is in direct opposition to the conscious 
self-determination of the Cartesian cogito, the self-legislation of the Kantian noumenal 
self, and the Hegelian account of free personality. For Lacan, the freedom of the "I," 
as it is witnessed in phenomenological self-experience, is an illusion: completely 
determined by cultural and linguistic influences, the ego is the object of the subject of the 
unconscious. Although this does not prevent the existence of human freedom for 
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Lacan or Ziiek, it means that freedom itself gets displaced from consciousness into the 
unconscious, in a move formally similar to Schelling but with an important twist. The 
subject is not a substantial self-actualizing activity but is an impersonal place-holder 
that guarantees the minimal consistency of self as a self-relating centre of negativity. It 
has no content because it is pure form. 
Lacanian psychoanalysis categorizes experience in terms of three registers, the 
Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real. All three exist in dialectical simultaneity, so that 
they all depend upon and interpenetrate each other. Lacan uses a Borromean knot to 
illustrate this level of mutual co-existence.2 This makes it hard to argue for the primacy 
of one register over the other because it is unclear if either can have logical priority 
insofar as the cutting off of one destroys the whole. The Imaginary is roughly 
equivalent to phenomenological self-experience and perception, but is also related to 
the cogito and its "narcissistic" fantasy of existential self-mastery and self-familiarity. 
The Symbolic is the logical fabric of language and culture which transcends and is 
anterior to the concretely existing subject. It therefore precedes the imaginary orbit of 
experience insofar as the phenomenological constitution of objects presupposes 
language. In its simplest form, the Real is that which does not fall under the Imaginary 
or the Symbolic. Its upsurge, therefore, is associated with experiences of breakdown 
and inconsistency not only of the transcendental unity of experience, but even of the 
Symbolic itself Lacan and Zizek therefore use a plethora of adjectives to describe it, 
which attempt to captivate this element of irrevocable and necessary logical and 
existential rupture: "traumatic," "monstrous," "horrifYing," "impossible." 
But at the heart of Zizek's philosophy is a fundamental ambiguity in Lacan's 
2 See Le shninaire, Lime XX: Encore, 1972-1973 (Paris: Seuil, 1999), p. 107-125. 
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definition of the Real. It is uncertain how the Real should be interpreted. There are 
two possibilities. Firstly, the Real could the excluded Other of the Imaginary and 
Symbolic, which only truly "comes to be" when the self constitutes itsel£ In this sense, 
the Real as lack is not only dependent upon the symbolic matrix of language and the 
orbit of phenomenological experience but also only shows itself negatively through 
their immanent breakdown and blockage. The Real as lack is distinctly Hegelian: it 
corresponds to concepts such as "tarrying with the negative" and the suffering that 
consciousness undergoes when it runs up against non-coincidence, paradox, and 
limitation. Secondly, there is also the possibility of understanding the Real as pre-
subjective life from which the self exiles itself through becoming a linguistic subject, 
yet upon which the Imaginary and the Symbolic depend. Bruce Fink refers to this as 
Real, because it is the necessary posit of the Symbolic, whose "ciphering" activity 
reconstitutes reality by meditating it through the differential system of language and 
thus creates simultaneously the condition of the possibility of its breakdown.3 These 
"kinks" in the Symbolic correspond with Real as lack or Real2, something which 
cannot be integrated because it presents itself as non-relational. Yet, insofar as this pre-
subjective Real in itself is without lack (only with language can we speak of absence and 
presence),4 the "idealizing" process of human meaning makes it "impossible" to reach. 
As something which overreaches the idealizing activity of the subject, in this modality the 
Real as excess corresponds to the Schellingian concept of the indivisible remainder (der 
nie atif!Jehende Reste), that which can never be brought into light of consciousness yet 
upon which all consciousness rests. The problem is as follows: Is Real, a necessary 
3 See Chapter Three, "The Creative Function of the Word: The Symbolic and the Real," in The 
Lacanian Subject· Between Language and]ouissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) p. 24-31. 
4 One of many possible quotes: "By definition, the real is full." Lacan, Le seminaire, LWre rv; La relation 
d'obJet elks structuresformelks (Paris: Seuil, 1994), p. 218. 
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imaginary construct of the Symbolic designed to give illusory positive meaning to 
Reab (structuralist metapsychology)? Or is it the pre-symbolic, ontological basis of the 
Symbolic, to which we have access despite the impossibility of reaching the pure Real 
through the differential system of language (ontology, Naturphilosophie)? If the second is 
possible, what does this mean in terms of Lacan's declaration of the equivalence and 
interpenetration of the registers? 
Even if all three registers exists in a dialectical simultaneity in terms of the 
constitution of personality, within the development of Lacanian psychoanalysis we see 
a gradual movement from an emphasis on one register over the other. Lacan's early 
work is largely an attempt to come to terms with the mirror stage and its implications 
for understanding the genesis of the ego. In the mirror stage, which happens around 
the age of six months, there is a recognition of an immanent blockage in nature which 
tears apart the organic unity of the body. The human neonate lacks motor 
coordination; its self-experience is fragmented and lacking internal unity. Lacan's 
provocative thesis is that the only way out of this biological short circuit is a ve~ a 
misrecognition of the primordial helplessness of the human organism in the virtual 
image of its mirror self in which the child finds a mesmerizing and captivating lie of 
false mastery into which it libidinally invests itself. The result is a reorganization of the 
fragmented being of the child through a virtual, and therefore, illusionary schemata as 
the self becomes alienated from its real, substantial being. Yet, Lacan comes to see that 
the imaginary, phenomenological beginnings of the subject are themselves grounded 
in the Symbolic: the only reason why the child becomes tantalized by his image is 
because his or her parents provoke the response. "Look, it's you!" In this sense, the 
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entire genesis of the self is preceded by a carving out of a space for the child within 
the symbolic universe of familial relations even before the child was born. Mter this 
"linguistic turn," Lacan turns all of his attention to the nature of the Symbolic. 
Inspired by the work of Levi-Strauss, who argued that "[s]tructurallinguistics 
will certainly play the same renovating role with respect to the social sciences that 
nuclear physics, for example, has played for the physical sciences," Lacan began to 
apply the methodology of Saussure's structuralism to psychoanalysis.5 This was largely 
done by a retour to Freud. Lacan argues that structural linguistics gives psychoanalysis 
the scientific rigour that it needs by systematizing the logic of the unconscious. This is 
where Lacan's famous sayings such as "the unconscious is structured like a language" 
originate. Linked to this linguistic turn are his critiques of ego-psychology as an 
attempt to strengthen the ego, and post-Freudian attempts to biologize the unconscious. 
For Lacan, the unconscious is strictly speaking a linguistic phenomenon: it only 
emerges tifler the advent of language in the split between the subject of enunciation 
and the enunciating subject. It has nothing to do with deep-lying personality structures 
or instinctual libidinal energetics. Moreover, Lacan makes a significant modification to 
the Saussurean logic: he departs from the signified/ signifYing polarity at the core of the 
sign in order to emphasis what Saussure calls "linguistic value," which shows that a sign 
only has value as such within a self-referential and differential system.6 A material 
correlate in objective reality is, as such, unnecessary for the creation of signs. For 
Lacan, insofar as symptoms are signifiers and the unconscious is semiotic, like a language, 
signifiers always move along chains and never reach the "Real." 
5 Levi-Strauss. "Structural analysis in linguistics and in anthropology," in Structural Anthropology, trans. 
Claire jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 33. 
6 See Saussure, Cours de linguistiquegb!erale (Paris: Payot, 1995), p. 155-169. 
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Although this suggests a kind of obvious superseding of the Imaginary by the 
Symbolic, commentators such as Richard Boothby and Alexander Leupin warn 
against this. The differential network of signifiers of language are themselves only 
possible through an original phenomenological perception of them. 7 Moreover, the later 
Lacan's topological formalizations of the psyche, as already mentioned, proclaim a 
strict equivalency, so that "the symbolic order's supremacy appears as an aporia, an 
ethical decision that logic does not support."8 
What most strongly distinguishes Zizek from other Lacanians is his attempt to 
rethink Lacanian psychoanalysis by focusing entirely on the late turn towards the Real. 
Because of this, he rarely if ever speaks of structural linguistics or the importance of 
Gestalt psychology. Just as the Symbolic adds a deeper, more penetrating level to 
understanding the Imaginary, for Zizek the Real adds irreducible conceptual structures 
to the Symbolic. Focusing on the other tendencies explicit in the Lacanian 
unconscious, therefore, risks missing the radicalness of Lacan's position in ZiZek's view. 
Although this is not a controversial thesis as such (Bruce Fink and Lorenzo Chiesa, 
amongst others, hold the same view), for Zizek this shift demands something 
completely different than what we see in Lacanian orthodoxy. It implies that in order 
to grasp the essence of psychoanalysis we need to do two things: (i) 
metapsychologically explicate the ontogenesis of the subject in terms of a materialism 
of the Real; (ii) return to German Idealism instead of focusing on Lacan's relationship 
to nineteenth- and twentieth-century psychology, French structuralism, the Prague 
school of linguistics, or existentialism. 
7 See Richard Boothby, Freud as Philosopher: MetapsychologyA}lt:r lAcan (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 
86-94. 
8 See Alexander Leupin, lAcan Todf91: Psychoanalysis, Scimce and ReligWn (New York: Other Press, 2004) p. 
27. 
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What is amazing about this "dialogue," however, is the heterodox reading of 
the German Idealist tradition that it produces. To many critics, ZiZek simply shows no 
concern for textual faithfulness, traditional hermeneutics or the history of ideas in his 
readings of Kant, Hegel and Schelling (and, for that matter, even Lacan~. His 
methodological approach appears, if anything, to function through a deliberate 
misunderstanding or liberal reconstruction. Although there is superficially some truth 
in these critiques -indeed, ZiZek often focuses on marginal selections of texts and 
raises them a level of logical priority that they do not have in the original, or takes 
mere textual gestures as expressing the essential nature of a certain key concept and 
refuses to ground then within the overall systematicity or intention of a philosopher's 
thought- one of Zizek's own comments on the nature of his own type of 
philosophical interpretation is very helpful here for understanding his approach: 
Hegel didn't know what he was doing. You have to interpret him. Let 
me give you a metaphoric formula. You know the term Deleuze uses for 
reading philosophers - anal interpretation, buggering them. Deleuze 
says that, in contrast to other interpreters, he anally penetrates the 
philosopher, because it's immaculate conception. You produce a 
monster. I'm trying to do what Deleuze forgot to do - to bugger Hegel, 
with Lacan [chuckles] so that you get monstrous Hegel, which is, for 
me, precisely the underlying radical dimension of subjectivity which 
then, I think, was missed by Heidegger. But again, the basic idea being 
this mutual reading, this mutual buggering [Chuckles] of this focal 
point, radical negativity and so on, of German Idealism with the very 
fundamental (Germans have this nice term, grundeswig) insight of 
psychoanalysis. 
Even if Zizek describes his own philosophy as an act of violence, almost of rape (it is 
also worth mentioning that the word "bugger" originates the old French bougre, 
9 Ian Parker, for instance, criticizes ZiZek for strongly reconceptualizing many of Lacan's strictly 
speaking clinical concepts so that they function in the sphere of socio-political theory without 
considering the intention of these concepts, paying close attention to his misrepresentation of the 
revolutionary status of Antigone. See Ian Parker's Slavoj ,?_itek: A Critical IntroductWn (London: Pluto 
Press, 2004), p. 74-81. 
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meaning heretic, and acquires its colloquial sense from heresy being associated with 
deviate, outlawed sexual practices), this quote reveals a hidden methodological 
presupposition which guides all of Zizek's interpretative work. The comparison of his 
own philosophy to that of Deleuze's is of crucial importance. It allows us to see that, 
even if Ziiek is going against surface textual movements he, at least, does not 
understand his own philosophy as in any way arbitrary, a deliberate misunderstanding 
of the philosophers he is engaging, or even demonstrating a total lack of disregard for 
faithfulness to the tradition. Ziiek recognizes that he is not doing traditional history of 
philosophy or philological, exegetical interpretation, but is, instead, attempting to do 
something that is productive of new concepts through his engagement with classical 
texts - but this generative, creative activity of concept-creation must, in some sense, be 
necessarily destructive, it must create a monster. 
Therefore, Zi.Zek is not interested in directly in what the texts of the German 
Idealist tradition have to say. What concerns him are hitherto unrealized textual 
potentialities within the texts, premonitions or traces of which we can see, often only 
in marginal comments or in various conceptual structures which often go against the 
flow of the totality of statements that constitute a philosophical system and therefore 
protrude out of its symbolic universe, negatively contorting it from the inside. Yet, it is 
only by means of a thorough familiarity with this totality and its surface affirmations 
that one can arrive at such unearthed possibilities and "reactualize" them. Ziiek's own 
methodological approach to the history of philosophy, however, differs from that of 
Deleuze's insofar as it has its ground within Lacanian psychoanalysis, within its 
fundamental claim that we can never say what we mean because there is a irremovable 
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gap between the symbolicje (the I, the grammatical subject) and the imaginary moi (the 
me, the subject of self-conscious awareness). 10 Not only is language something that 
exerts control over you more than you have power over it (you as ego are spoken rather 
than a speaking linguistic subject), but its surface content often belies a greater 
(consciously) disavowed (but unconsciously known) truth, a truth which is not "hidden" 
in some deep, elusive place, but is so obvious that we do not see it.11 In the slips and 
mistakes of discourse, in marginal hints and gestures, we catch a glimpse of the Real 
as that which cannot be said directly in the discourse but around which it moves. 
Zizek's reading of German Idealism, therefore, is an attempt to psychoanalytically 
expose what the tradition in fact says by revealing what has been primordially 
repressed in the affirmations of a text. Although one can, of course, take issue with 
this methodology, one must admit that, by means of it, critiques that take issue with 
Zizek's selective reading or "obvious misinterpretations" often just miss the point. A 
more apt critique would be one that, from within the very movement Zi:lek's 
psychoanalytical reactualization of a text, from within its symbolization of its 
repressed, finds other spectral presences, other fragments of the Real, which haunt its 
own symbolic universe. This is what I in this piece hope to gesture towards in this 
thesis. 
Starting from the psychoanalytical experience of the constitutive disharmony 
between mind and body as the necessary basis of human freedom, Zizek internally 
modifies the Grundlogik of the entire movement. By finding premonitions of the 
10 See Lacan, "Response to Jean Hyppolite's Commentary on Freud's 'Verneinung,'" in Ecrits, trans. 
Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), p. 318-333. 
11 "The psychoanalyst is not an explorer of unknown continents or of grand depths, but a linguist: he 
learns to decode the writing that is already there, under his eyes, open to the look of everyone." 
Lacan, "Clefs pour Ia psychoanalyse (entretien avec Madeleine Chapsal)." Retrieved May 16 2010 
from: http:/ /www.ecole-lacanienne.net/documents/ 195 7-05-3l.doc 
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concept of Todestrieb, he takes the German Idealist attempts to think Substance as 
Subject to be some kind of ontological interconnecting of mind and body, and 
reconfigures this relation of positive organic union and logical interpenetration into a 
negative disjuncture of the two terms, an irreducible dialectical parallax. Here, he 
thinks he is radicalizing a possibility for understanding the ontogenesis of the subject 
that he sees negatively affirmed a la Freudian Verneinung (negation, denial). 
It is this "slight" modification of the Grundlogik of German Idealism that is of 
utmost importance for understanding Zizek's reading of Kant, Hegel and Schelling. 
Firstly, it demonstrates the heterodox character of his appropriation of the tradition 
insofar as he proclaims that its real truth has always been the disjunctive, parallax 
relationship between system and freedom. 12 Secondly, it shows how Zizek tries to 
ground his own specific take on the tradition by founding it within and making it 
relatively coherent with what is at stake in post-Kantian idealism, even if the stakes 
themselves have been modified and reformatted drastically along the way. This makes 
reading Zizek a strange experience because there is an irreconcilable tension between 
Zizek's account of German Idealism and what German Idealism itself takes itself to 
be; the former is never completely in tune with the latter. Because Zizek's 
"reactualization" is not equivalent to an act of philological exegesis or traditional 
hermeneutics, one needs to take into account that Zizek understands his entire project 
as a way to breath life into, "to render actual for today's time, the legacy of German 
Idealism" through psychoanalysis.13 The most obvious implications of this approach, 
however, is that the reader cannot shake off the impression that Zizek is only reading 
12 See AF 11-14. 
13 Ziiek, "Liberation Hurts: An Interview with Slavoj Zizek (with Eric Dean Rasmussen)." Retrieved 
Feb 23 20 I 0 from: http:/ /www.elecu·onicbookreview.com/ thread/ endconstruction/ desublimation 
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the texts of the German Idealist tradition in order to find material to support his own 
philosophical presuppositions. To call his work on this movement a "reading" is, 
therefore, misleading, because it is largely removed from the concerns of the tradition. 
Ziiek's project is to develop and excavate a new materialist account of the 
subject consistent with Lacanian psychoanalysis, which he sees prefigurations of in 
Kant, Schelling and Hegel. Specifically in the latter's conception of the subject as seen 
in notions such as "spirit is a bone," "substance as subject," "tarrying with the 
negative" or the "night of the world," Zizek not only sees a profound articulation of 
the unsurpassability of the negative that is remarkably Lacanian in structure and 
spirit, but more importantly, the possibility of a radical dialectics based on the 
contingency of finitude. Zizek situates himself against what he calls cliche 
interpretations of Hegel which see him as "deducing" reality from the self-mediation 
of the ideal Notion pre-existing the material flux of being.14 For Zizek such a move 
misses the radicalness of Hegelian dialectics, which has no need to "exit" contingency 
in order to account for the dialectical self-actualization of reality. What Zizek means 
by this is most clearly seen in his reading of the logic of essence from Hegel's Science of 
Logic, where the dialectical union of contingency and necessity acquires a new twist: it 
is not that essence dialectically depends upon appearance in order to actualize itself, 
that it is logical void without the external conditions for its manifestation and therefore 
cannot be spoken of "in-itself" in a Platonic sense, but that the move from 
contingency to necessity is merely a formal conversion, the empty gesture of giving a 
name (creating a master signifier, a "quilting point") to a series of external conditions 
14 See TS 55. 
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and in the fact changes nothing at the level of substantial reality.15 The Hegelian 
notion of positing of presuppositions is a retroactive performativity, a purely 
symbolical movement, so that "[t]he absolute is, hence, nothing but the propername of 
the belatedness constitutive of any logical space as such," it can "only constitute itself 
after the fact." 16 
What one will notice in reading Zizek's work, however, is that although he often 
emphases the shortcomings of standard, "conservative" ways of interpreting Hegel 
(his critique of Charles Taylor in the Ticklish Subject is a noteworthy exception), he 
rarely if ever mentions sources. Yet, when one looks at the history of the reception of 
Hegelian philosophy, both old and new, one finds a plethora of different ways in which 
Zi:lek's own reading has important historical precedents and contemporary 
homologues. Just to name a few: within the traditional Old Hegelians of post-
idealistic Germany we have, of course, the early Marx's and Engel's attempt to inverse 
the Hegelian system by returning to the concrete life of individuals as the basis of 
historical materialism and the later Marx's attempt to describe the logical unfolding of 
capital, an explicit reactualization of dialectical method; Koyeve's famous courses on 
Hegel, which not only reintroduced the intellectual scene of twentieth-century France 
to Hegelian philosophy, but also reworked and developed the central place of desire 
and negativity within Hegel's thought, albeit anthropologically, limiting these elements 
to human subjectivity;Jean Hyppolite's own work, which, in contradistinction to the 
humanistic interpretations following various Marxist and existentialist 
reappropriations of Hegel inspired by Koyeve, goes further by locating negativity 
15 See TN 148-152. 
16 Markus Gabriel & Slavoj Ziiek, "Introduction," in My/Jwwgy, Madness and Laughter: Subjectiuity in 
German Idealism (New York: Continuum, 2009), p. 8. 
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within the heart of being while emphasizing the dynamic and transformative element 
of dialectical movement and the always deferred status of the accomplishment of the 
absolute17; Adorno's negative dialectics, which rethinks key Hegelian concepts such as 
negative determination, the materialism-idealism relation, the role and paradox of 
subjectivity, all in ways that are remarkably similar to Zizek's own philosophi8; and, to 
conclude, contemporary thinkers such asjean-Luc Nancy, Catherine Malabou and 
even Markus Gabriel, with whom Zizek has recently worked on a book. In this sense, 
although Zizek's own attempt to distance himself from "cliche'' readings does serve to 
highlight the fundamental difference of his own appropriation of Hegel from various 
"conservative," perhaps textbook academic readings, it often appears, to someone 
immersed within Hegelian philosophy, too drastic and fails to do justice to the 
complicated, interesting history of its development. To a reader lacking knowledge in 
the field, it could make Zizek's interpretation seem more radical, original and 
breakthrough than it is (although this is by no means to deny that there is much 
nuance within it) and a reader of Ziiek must keep all of this in mind. Zizek appears, 
therefore, to be implicitly endorsing a revival of a distinction between conservative, 
right-wing and theologically-minded Old Hegelians and radical, left-wing atheistic 
Young Hegelians, but without laying out the battle field. 
In various places in Ziiek's work, he characterizes his project as strictly Hegelian 
because, like Hegel, the enigma which occupies him is the possibility of appearance 
itself, how the phenomenal realm of reality could emerge from the self-actualization of 
substance in such a way that subjectivity becomes irreducible to the flux of the 
17 Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure in Hegel's Phmrnnenowgy, trans. Samuel Cherniak &John Heckman 
(Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 145. 
18 Interestingly, ZiZek himself goes so far to say that Lacanian psychoanalysis is the answer to a 
fundamental paradox in Adorno's philosophy of the subject (OB 94-96). 
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material world. Yet, the only way for Zizek to guarantee that subjectivity is not illusory 
is by inscribing idealism into the heart of materialism as a rupturing event, the 
premonitions of which he claims to see in Hegel's philosophy. Arguing for a self-splitting 
of the noumenal, Zizek tries to show how the only consistent way to explain why there 
is experience is to posit an ontological breakdoum of being as the ontogenetic basis of 
the subject. Consequently, Zizek makes the following his axiomatic first-principle to 
explain the true meaning of Todestrieb: Freedom is not a ra~ brute fact, but an expression if 
the caustic collapse if material being, a brissure in the heart if Rea4 which is .rynonymous with the 
subject itself, "it designates ... the primordial Big Bang, the violent self-contrast by means 
of which the balance and inner peace of the Void of which mystics speak are 
perturbed, thrown out of joint" (TS 31). 
But in Zizek's own descriptions of this process of the autodisrupture of the Real 
there is an uncertain oscillation between the characterization of this process as 
Schellingian or Hegelian. Ziiek goes as far as to say that Schelling was "the first to 
formulate this task" (PV 166) and the philosopher who "gave the most detailed 
account of this X in his notion of the Ground of Existence" (TS 55). All of this, 
however, presents internal tension within his philosophy insofar as Zizek explicitly 
disavows any essential relationship between Lacanian philosophy and Schelling. 
Drawing largely upon the structural similarities between Schelling's account of 
disease and evil and the eruption of freely existing subjectivity, as well as Adrian 
Johnston's descriptions of the ontogenetic emergence of desire in the Stuttgart Lectures, 
my aim is to show how Zizek's transcendental materialism is a complex hybrid of 
Schellingian ontology and Hegelian logic. I will try to show that Zizek relies much 
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more upon Schelling in the development of his own materialist theory of the subject 
than he admits. It is here that we see the most fully developed account of the "self-
sundering" of being in terms of Schelling's logic of the Grund. Yet, as we will see, Zizek 
is only able to read Schelling's descriptions of the birth of consciousness from its 
material Grund as a metapsychology insofar as he imposes a Hegelian logic unto its 
structure which allows him to formalize Schelling and "purify" him from his 
theosophic commitments. If, as will become apparent through this thesis, it is Schelling 
that is the philosopher who most fully describes the material ontogenetic conditions for 
the emergence of the subject and who thus more penetratingly develops the logic 
which supplies the primordial basis for ZiZek's own metaphysics, Zizek's preference for 
Hegel over Schelling needs to be rethought. It appears inconsistent with the 
development and trajectory of Zizek's thinking. 
Immediately after his remarkable and provocative reading of Schelling within 
the first chapter of the Indivisible Remainder, Zizek goes on to argue for the supremacy of 
Hegelian dialectics over Schellingian logic. For him, Schelling is inferior because Grund 
and existence remain distinct from one another only by being grounded within Absolute 
Indifference, which is in itself neither. For Schelling, "the Absolute is primarily the 
'absolute indifference' providing the neutral medium for the coexistence of the polar 
opposites" of the real and the ideal (ID 1 05). Hegel provides a superior logic in which 
there is no need for a third principle of meditation. Here, the category of "and" 
changes. It becomes, in essence, tautological: the third term is already the second insofar 
as it has merely taken over the position of the first. In terms of substance and subject, 
this means that "this very reversal is the VfJTY definition of subject 'subject' is the name for the 
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principle of Selfhood which subordinates to itself the substantial Whole whose 
particular moment it originally was" (ID 106). Nothing at the level of content changes; 
it becomes a purely formal self-relation from within the radical non-coincidence of the 
Absolute with itself The dialectical movement from (i) immediacy- (ii) negation -
(iii) negation of negation is superior because (which Zizek suggests is contra to 
mainstream readings of Hegel, although here one is forced to think of Kojeve's 
famous and popular introduction to Hegel) there is no genuine return movement to 
the first. Something irreducibly different emerges (negativity is now made foundational 
to identity), an "out of joint" spirit which has a degree of notional self-reflexivity. 
As we shall see, Zi:lek's criticism of Schelling, however, does not apply to the 
entirety of Schelling's work. For Zizek, Schelling's philosophy is not characterized by 
an organic unity or continuity, but by a series of irreconcilable ruptures. He draws a 
distinction between Schelling1 of the period of quasi-Spinozism (the philosophy of 
indifference), Schellin~ of the radical ontology of freedom as seen in the second draft 
of the Weltalter, and Schelling3 of the philosophy of mythology and revelation, which is 
in a certain way a return to the first. What distinguishes the middle Schelling is strictly 
speaking the ontogenetic emergence of self-positing of freedom in a manner remarkably 
similar to the Hegelian dialectical movement from abstract immediacy to notional self-
reflexivity. 
Zi:lek himself draws attention to the pivotal importance of Schelling for 
understanding the ontogenesis of the subject, only in the end to disavow his debt to 
Schelling. Even if the logic of the Grund contains a premonition towards a radical 
transcendental materialism, Schelling is at the same time the father of "New Age 
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obscurantism" (AF 4). Expressing a reliance and debt to Schelling would, in essence, 
potentially bring Ziiek's own thinking uncomfortably close to everything he denies -
the non-Freudian unconscious (Bergsonian,Jungian, and Deleuzian), "pre-modern" 
cosmology, Romantic theories of nature, theosophy, and its pop-culture descendent, 
New Age spirituality. By placing the logic of the Grund at the heart of the 
psychoanalytic subject, Zizek in many ways risks "destabilizing'' the primacy of the 
Lacanian mode of the unconscious insofar as it opens up the possibility of interpreting 
the Real as excess. 
This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter, "From 
Transcendental Philosophy to Substance as Subject" is an account of Zizek's 
interpretation of the movement from Kant to Hegel, focusing on the role of Kant's 
articulation of the concrete experience of freedom and its repercussions for 
metaphysics. This will enable us to see how Ziiek's derives his own metapsychological 
parallax ontology from a specific reading of the Grundlogik which characterizes 
German Idealism. Next, in "The Logic of Transcendental Materialism" I sketch how, 
for Zizek, Hegel's attempt to think through the deadlock of freedom as opened up by 
Kant is in the end incomplete because it fails to think through its irrevocable 
implications in terms of the passage from nature to culture. Here I present my 
argument for the priority of Schelling over Hegel in terms of an ontogenetic account 
of the emergence of the subject, insofar as Ziiek relies almost exclusively on the 
former to articulate the ontological collapse that serves as its basis. In the last chapter 
"The Abyss of the Unconscious" I deal with Zizek's argument for the superiority of 
Hegelian dialectics over the Schellingian tendency to found ground and existence in a 
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third principle and how he purports to "fix up" Schelling's metapsychology in the 
second draft of the Weltalter. Finally, in my conclusion I lay out what is at stake in 
Ziiek's parallax ontology and raise some critical questions as to the ambiguous nature 
of the Real. 
Because one of the goals of this project is to prove the primacy of Schelling in 
Zizek's transcendental materialism, I only deal explicitly with three of Zizek's works. I 
use what he refers to as his two theoretical magnum opera, The Ticklish Subject and The 
Parallax Vuw, insofar as it is most clearly here that Zizek articulates the theoretical 
concerns of his ontology. I add The Indivisible Remainder to this list, insofar as in my view 
it is crucial for understanding the Ziiekian subject. 
There has been a recent explosion of secondary works published on Ziiek and 
even an international journal inaugurated in 2007 on his philosophy. Yet the majority 
of the books written on his thinking is lacking any significant study of the relationship 
of his appropriation of German Idealism to his own transcendental materialism. The 
most obvious exception, however, is Adrian johnston's Zif.ek's Ontology: A Transcendental 
Materialist Theory of Subjectivity, which is an attempt to systematize the ontological 
edifice that underlies Zizek's philosophy through an in-depth representation of his 
reading of Kant, Schelling and Hegel. Insofar as this is a book written in the spirit of 
Zizek (and is in many ways a celebration of his work) and which demonstrates a high 
degree of quality, I treat it throughout with the same kind of theoretical primacy as 
one of Zizek's own works. 
My thesis distinguishes itself from the body of current literature that exists on 
Zizek because it argues for the logical primacy of Schelling over H egel in Zizek's 
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transcendental materialism - a point which not only Adrian johnston would disagree 
with, but even Zizek himself, insofar as this would bring his own philosophical account 
of the subject dangerously close to aspects of the Schellingian unconscious that he 
disavows. This present work, therefore, is an attempt to add to the secondary literature 
on Zizek's relation to German Idealism and further our understanding of his project 
by explicating its overt "Schellingian" character. 
In terms of the rest of Zizek literature, most books can be divided into three 
categories. (i) The phenomena of thin postmodern "introductions" which attempt to 
summarize and give easy to understand accounts of the fundamental concepts of a 
philosopher. Here I am thinking specifically of Sarah Kay's <,it.ek: A Critical Introduction 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2003), Tony Myers, Slavoj <,it_ek (London: Routledge, 2003) and Ian 
Parker's Slavoj <,it_ek: A Critical Introduction (London: Pluto Press, 2004). Although 
interesting, these studies are general to the point of superficiality. (ii) Works which 
focus on Zi:lek's critical theory and politics. Here the list is longer: Rex Butler's Slavoj 
<,it_ek: live Theory (London: Continuum, 2005);Jodi Dean, <,it_ek's Politics (London: 
Routledge, 2006); Adrian johnston's Badiou, <,it_ek, and Political Transformations: The 
Cadence of Change (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 2009); and Matthew 
Sharpe's Slavoj <,it_ek, a little piece of the Real (London: Ashgate, 2004) come to mind. 
These works demonstrate a certain tendency to read Zizek as an important 
sociopolitical critic rather than a philosopher. (iii) His relationship to theology: 
Frederiek Depoortere's Christ in Postmodern Philosoplry: Gianni Vattimo, Rene Girard, and 
Slavoj <,it_ek (New Work: T & T Clark, 2008), Adam Kotsk's, <,it_ek and Theology (New 
York: T & T Clark, 2008) and Marcus Pound's <,it_ek: A (Very) Critical Introduction (Grand 
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Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008). Even if these books demonstrate more of a sincere attempt 
to penetrate into the core of Zizek's philosophy by investigating his ambiguous relation 
to theology, they still fail to explicitly deal with the nature of Zizek's encounter with 
German Idealism as essential to the core of his own philosophy (moreover, Pound's 
focal point is the relationship between the political and the theological in his work). 
One of the major exceptions in this category, however, is the book Zizek himself co-
authored with John Milbank, The Monstrosiry of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic? (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2009), which deals with Zizek's turn to German Idealism in terms of the 
Christian legacy. 
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Chapter L From Transcendental Philosophy to Substance as Subject 
In this chapter I will sketch Zizek's interpretation of the philosophical 
movement from Kant to Hegel by focusing on Kant's articulation of the concrete 
experience of freedom and how it radically reshapes the terrain of metaphysical 
inquiry. In the aftermath of the critical philosophy, what is clear is that any philosophy 
which is unable to think system and the irreducible autonomy of the human is to be 
rejected. By following certain premonitions within Kant's pedagogical writings which 
appear to link transcendental spontaneity to the psychoanalytical concept of Todestrieb, 
Zizek reads Hegelian Absolute Idealism against standard interpretations by claiming 
that Hegel's attempt to think Substance as Subject implies the ontogenetic emergence 
of freedom through a self-sundering of being. Not only does this enable Zizek to 
rethink the Kant-Hegel relation in a provocative manner, but it also lets him at the 
same time develop the logic of his own transcendental materialism. 
Following Lacan's claim that "Kant's practical philosophy [is] the starting point 
of the lineage culminating in Freud's invention of psychoanalysis," Zizek's project 
could be described as having two goals (PV 48). Firstly, because the Lacanian subject is 
lacking any theory of its own ontogenesis, ZiZek turns to German Idealism to develop 
a transcendental materialism that would ground it, insofar as there is an obvious 
structural parallelism that exists in the underlying problematic that plagues both post-
Kantian idealism and contemporary psychoanalysis. Secondly, and more strongly, 
Zizek's claim is that this parallelism is more than a mere shared set of theoretical 
concerns. If we read Kant, Hegel and Schelling through the Lacanian subject, we 
actually can see the underlying identi!J that exists between the psychoanalytical subject, 
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haunted by the Todestrieb as the constitutive ground of its very existence, and the 
operative logic of the German Idealism tradition. 
Leaving aside the controversial nature of the second claim, Lacan's assertion, 
at first, appears counter-intuitive, if not completely false. One would expect the 
clearest elaboration of the subject in Kant's philosophical treatises on the mediating 
structures of consciousness. And what do we see by delving into practical reason 
except an attempt to ground the ethical in the self-legislative spontaneity of human 
freedom, the expression of the categorical imperative and an outlining of duties? 
However, even if this might be the image of Kantian practical philosophy that always 
comes to mind, the matter at hand is, of course, far more complicated. 
Kant's practical philosophy is of essential importance because it is an expression 
and systematization of the experience of freedom, here understood as the self-legislative 
spontaneity at the core of human subjectivity, that faculty that which separates us from 
the rest of mechanical nature insofar as we generate our own laws.19 One must also 
remember that for Kant, the Critique of Pure Reason is an attempt to make room for 
faith by limiting knowledge and reason. This is a point that directs the entirety of the 
critical enterprise to penetrating into the irreducible primordiality of human 
spontaneity at all costs. Like the other representatives of German Idealism, Ziiek sees 
something fundamentally ground breaking in Kant's ethical writings: "Kantian 
practical reason provides a glimpse into the abyss of freedom beyond (or beneath) the 
constraints of traditional metaphysical ontology" (TS 48). 
What interests Zizek in Kant's pedagogical writings is how they set the stage for 
19 Schelling, for instance, situates the true Kantian breakthrough in the Critique if" Practical Reason. See 
FS 232. 
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what he claims is the Grundlogik of German Idealism: 
The key point is thus that the passage from "nature" to "culture" is not 
direct, that one cannot account for it within a continuous evolutionary 
narrative: something has to intervene between the two, a kind of 
"vanishing mediator," which is neither nature nor culture- this In-
between is silently presupposed in all evolutionary narratives. We are 
not idealists: this In-between is not the spark of logos magically 
conferred on Homo sapiens, enabling them to form his supplementary 
virtual symbolic surroundings, but precisely something that, although it 
is also no longer nature, is not yet logos, and has to be "repressed" by 
logos - the Freudian name for this In-between, of course, is the death 
drive. Speaking of this In-between, it is interesting to note how 
philosophical narratives of the "birth of man" are always compelled to 
presuppose such a moment of human (pre)history when (what will 
become) man is no longer a mere animal and simultaneously not a 
"being of language," bound by symbolic Law; a moment of thoroughly 
"perverted," "denaturalized," "derailed" nature which is not yet 
culture. (TS 36) 
According to Ziiek, within Kant this "In-between" finds its expression in the necessity 
to discipline the excessive "unruliness" (Wildheit) of human nature, the "wild, 
unconstrained propensity to insist stubbornly on one's own will, cost what it may" (TS 
36.). Yet, this "unruliness" cannot be equated with the brute reality of animal 
existence (contrary to standard readings). Zizek quotes Kant himself: 
The love of freedom is naturally so strong in man, that when once he 
has grown accustomed to freedom, he will sacrifice everything for its 
sake ... . Owing to his natural love of freedom, it is necessary that man 
should have his natural roughness smoothed down; with animals, their 
instinct renders this unnecessary.20 (TS 36) 
For Zizek, this demonstrates that the enigma of the emergence of subjectivity cannot 
be reduced to a mere dichotomy between nature and culture, as if in order to conform to 
the symbolic law of our own making we must first tame the blind, egotistical pleasure-
seeking principles of our animal nature. The self-creative, ontologically autonomous 
milieu of culture is only possible through a prior, infinitely uncontainable freedom 
20 Kant, Kant on EducatWn, trans. Annette Churton (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co, 1900), p. 4-5. 
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which acts as the "vanishing mediator" between brute animal reality and structured 
human sociopolitical existence. The passage to culture does not consist in a 
overcoming or sublimation of animalistic needs, but rather through a disciplining of 
an excessive "unruliness" that marks human nature.21 Zizek links this to the Cartesian 
gap between man and nature because it names an intrinsic break or breach from the 
order of positive being that sets the stage for the cogito's autonomy. It points to its 
primordial ontological basis as that which can only be grasped through its own 
uncontainable nature, which is simultaneously a potentially excessive diabolic evil. If 
human subjectivity is tru!J self-legislative, this means that, at its zero-level, there can be 
no formal distinction between a good and evil free act insofar as both are self-guiding, 
self-chosen: good itself is only possible through the gentrification, the taming, of evil. 
For Zizek, therefore, Kantian practical philosophy is the beginning of 
psychoanalysis because here we can already see its traits principaux. Consequently, 
insofar as Kant himself asserts an ultimate identity between the theoretical and 
practical ego, Zizek argues for the interpenetration of modern transcendental 
philosophy and psychoanalysis through the concept of "unruliness." Todestrieb becomes 
a synonym for the transcendental subject by giving expression to the pre-subjective 
conditions of the possibility of freedom as some kind of violent "disturbance" in 
nature that serves as its ontogenetic basis. But many questions remained unsolved in 
Kant: Why does the transcendental spontaneity itself develop? What is its exact 
relation to the "unruliness" at the core of our being which appears to logically precede 
21 This could be further explicated by supplementing it with a number of possible citations from 
Religion within tk limits qf Reason Alone, the first book of which attempts to deal with the radical 
propensity to evil at the core of subjectivity by arguing two major points: (i) "the ground of this evil 
cannot be placed, as is so commonly done, in man's sensuous nature" and (ii) "neither can the 
ground of this evil be placed in a corruption of the morally legislative reason." Religion within the 
Limits qf Reason Alone, trans. T.M. Greene and H.H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 30. 
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it? Insofar as transcendental spontaneity is related to the synthetic powers of the 
imagination and to "unruliness," what is the relationship between them? 
Within the trajectory of modern philosophy, the inheritors of the legacy of the 
critical philosophy all agree that it is with Kant that we see the .first truly penetrating 
account of the essence of human freedom.22 For ZiZek, this means that it is here that 
the principal intuitions that heralded forth modernity - the schism between thinking 
mind and extended substance, the irreducible reflexivity of subjectivity - get 
radicalized and find stronger theoretical articulation. Post-Kant, all of the immediate 
representatives of German Idealism agree that there is no going back: this would be to 
give up on the intuition of irreducible human freedom. Any system which regresses 
into a more "primitive," "pre-modern" way of philosophizing is, in effect, merely 
recoiling from the unbearable burden of freedom. Mter Kant there is only "the 
uncanny abyss of freedom without any guarantee in the Order of Being" (PV 93). 
In the immediate aftermath of transcendental idealism, however, there is an 
ambiguity as to how to proceed. Although there is some general consensus concerning 
the various different ways in which the critical system is flawed, inconsistent, and by 
itself incomplete, internal discords quickly emerge within the tradition. Not content 
with Fichte's own response to the dilemma because it only intensifies the problematic 
by making nature a mere posit of the Absolute Subject, Schelling and Hegel attempt 
to give an account of the birthplace of the "I" as causa sui. In the language of the early 
Schelling, Fichte creates an acceptable subjective idealism insofar as the creative 
potency of nature as more than and inclusive of the "I" is lost. What is necessary for 
22 Schelling says in his Freiheitschri.fl that it is idealism that "we have to thank for the first perfect concept 
of freedom" (FS 231 ). The same applies to Zizek: " o wonder Kant is lk philosopher of freedom: 
with him, the deadlock of freedom emerges" (PV 94). 
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Schelling is a theoretical project which attempts to supplement the solipsistic Fichtean 
subject with an account of the immanent genesis of subjectivity out of a creative, 
unconscious nature, which would implicate an elaboration of the interpenetration and 
ultimate identity of the two.23 Initially satisfied with Schelling's response to the 
deadlock of Fichtean idealism,24 Hegel later breaks from what he refers to as an 
"objective idealism," a mere reactionary form of idealism. By attempting to solve the 
excessive internal contradictions of subjective idealism, Schellling ends up being its 
inverted opposite.25 But what exactly, then, is the Hegelian attempt to solve tl1e enigma 
of the Kantian subject and how does it differ from Schelling's? And, more importantly, 
why is this juncture important for understanding Ziiek's transcendental materialism? 
Ziiek rquses the conventional interpretation of Hegel as a pan-logicist, "the 
standard cliche according to which German Idealism pleads the 'pan-logicist' 
reduction of all reality to the product of the self-mediation of the Notion" (TS 55). 
This conventional, textbook reading of German Idealism goes against what Zizek 
holds is really at stake in the tradition. It levels off the radicalness of Hegel's 
articulation of freedom by making it look like another classical metaphysical system. 
This interpretation is false for two reasons. Not only are Hegel and Schelling 
attempting to demonstrate how it is still possible to do metaphysics within the very 
23 See Schelling, System qf Transcmdmtal Idealism, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 2001), p. 232. 
24 According to Hegel, for "Fichte comes closer than Kant to managing the antithesis of nature and 
freedom and exhibiting nature as an absolute effect and deed," while, for Schelling, "nature is not a 
stillness of being;" rather, "it is a being that becomes; or, in other words, it is not split and 
synthesized from the outside, it sunders itself freely, not just as something limited, but as the whole." 
In this sense, Schelling represents a philosophical advancement towards the System. The Di.ffermce 
Betwem Fu:hte's and Schelling's System qf Philosophy, trans. H . S. Harris & Walter Cerf (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1977), p. 143 & 168. 
25 In his Lectures on the History qf PhiWsophy, H egel declares Schelling as merely Fichte's successor, ironically 
going against the spirit of his early work on the intrinsic and insurmountable dijfermces between 
them. 
29 
.------------------------------------- -----------------
framework of the breakthrough of critical philosophy and without denying any of what 
they take to be its necessary I essential presuppositions, but also, and most importantly, 
why it is necessary to do so. Although this means a vigorous rethinking of concepts such 
as transcendental spontaneity and imagination, the noumena and the status of nature, 
in the end neither of them want to give up on Kant's descriptions of freedom in order 
to substitute transcendental idealism with another classical system. 
This becomes more obvious when we realize that for both Hegel and Schelling, 
Spinoza is the emblem of a philosopher. Both Schelling and Hegel see the two 
questions of system and freedom as ultimately intertwined and refuse to separate them 
as Kant does. Amongst other things, Spinozistic metaphysics represents an avid 
attempt to rethink the Cartesian ontological splitting of mind and matter by 
reconceiving the very notion of substance so that the two categories no longer 
represent a schismatic split but are subsumable under a single, unified substrate. Mind 
and matter, the brute material Real of the universe and the reflexive powers of ideal 
Spirit, are merely different expressions of the same, unchanging substance, a kind of 
episternic parallax shift between two different logical modalities of an all-persuasive 
weave which encompasses all things within its vital ebb and flow. This means that 
humans are free, but only insofar as they participate within the self-actualizing 
movement of substance (God, nature) as causa sui. Here Zizek makes the claim that 
within this picture the apparent autonomous essence of subjectivity is merely an 
epiphenomenon, a false appearance, of the vital flux of a more primordial life-force 
that runs through and simultaneously is the universe, leaving nothing untouched and 
no room for an otherness within its self-contained, harmonious machinery. 
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In Spinozism, the individual, subjective freedom therefore arises out of a 
misrecognition of our fundamentally determined character. By locating freedom 
within the kernel of my being, I am merely misperceiving its notion: real spontaneity 
lies in the self-generating harmony of the universe, the self-creative flow of life and 
difference, of which I also play a constitutive part through direct participation. 
Spinoza's account of human freedom, instead of being a pure cancelation of concrete 
human freedom by its submission to the total system of the world in its oneness, unity 
and harmony, is an attempt to, in many ways, show its greater truth, meaning and role 
in the life of God or nature, its basis within the self-actualization of substance. What 
Zizek adds here, however, perhaps implicitly basing himself on various assertions of 
the inadequacy of Spinoza's account of freedom within the post-Kantian German 
Idealist tradition,26 is that this direct participation can only be passive participation. 
Even if Spinoza, for example, allows for the power of mind over body and a certain 
degree of spontaneous activity (substances and its modes must, after all, constitute one 
another), this does not come close to articulating the radicalness of freedom attested 
by Kant and even precludes it 27 Spinoza is unable to articulate the true kernel of 
human autonomy, a failure which not only makes the Spinozist metaphysical system 
insufficient in terms of the phenomenologically lived essence of freedom, but also 
thereby robs its ontology of life and richness. Humans are not mere passive players of 
a predetermined role in the self-unfolding drama of the universe, but must be 
irreducibly constitutive writers of it. What Zizek adds here is the claim that what 
Hegel and the middle Schelling implicitly find unsatisfactory about Spinoza is that he 
26 See FS 230lf. 
27 See FS 227. 
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is unable to articulate the ontogenetic condition of the possibiliry of the emergence of free 
transcendental subjectiviry out of the purely immanent plane of being. The problem is that 
freedom is not compatible with substance qua devouring totality. How, then, are we to 
think substance and subject/ system and freedom if we are to retain the spontaneity 
attested by Kant? For Ziiek, "[t]he passage from the Spinozan One qua the neutral 
medium/container of its modes and [sic] the One's inherent gap is the very passage 
from Substance to Subject" (PV 42). 
The immediate problematic in the aftermath of the critical system is that the 
Kantian affirmation of transcendental freedom must be grounded in an ontological 
edifice that can rival Spinozism, since otherwise a Spinozist could argue that freedom 
is merely the misrecognition of man's subsumption within the positive order of being and 
the universality of the immanent laws of (divine) nature. Hegel remains unsatisfied 
with the results of Schelling, both in terms of Schelling's "objective" idealist response 
to Fichte and his attempts to ground transcendental subjectivity and creative nature in 
Absolute Indifference between the two. As Ziiek's version of Hegel and the middle 
Schelling shows, Hegel here must have, at some level, implicitly recognized that 
Schelling missed the true radicalness of Kantian freedom and its implications. 
Consequently, Hegel tries to save the breakthrough of the critical system by thinking 
substance as subject, by thinking how the order of being exists in the mode of 
subjectivity, instead of merely tying two seemingly different yet complementary areas 
of thought together in a precarious unity. The task to be done is to fully actualize the 
primordial insight of the cogito by instituting the transcendental "I" and the schism it 
evokes directly into the Absolute. Hegel's goal is to balance Spinoza and Kant by 
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creating a metaphysical system that renders possible rather than precludes freedom. 
The problem is to explicate how a truly existing free subject can emerge from 
within the internal mechanics of substance. Zizek's radical claim is that the only way 
to explain this is by taking the ontological split announced by Cartesian subjectivity 
and pushing it to its limits by inscribing the non-coincidence of mind to matter within 
the very heart of being, the premonitions of which we see already in Hegel. If human 
freedom is irreducib!J self-reflexive and autonomous it cannot be understood in terms of 
the immanent pulsation of the Absolute. Reading the Hegelian response to Schelling 
through psychoanalysis, Zizek suggests that what provokes the immanent movement 
from transcendental philosophy to Hegelian Substance as Subject is how Spinozism 
and the Kantian articulation of freedom reciprocally expose each others' intrinsic 
limitations. While the latter lacks a metaphysics, the former misses the irrevocable 
(ontological) disturbance of nature at the foundational basis of the cogito, which signals 
that human spontaneity cannot be contained in the positive order of being. For Zizek 
the true breakthrough that we see in Kantian idealism, which gets radicalized and 
made explicit for the first time in Hegel, is the proclamation of transcendental 
freedom as Todestrieb, as an excess of being that breaks from all externally given laws. 
Because of the primordiality Zi:lek accords to the psychoanalytical experience of 
discord between mind and body, here he arrives at a conditional: If freedom exists, 
substance cannot be all. Substance's autodisruption is the condition of the possibility 
of the subject. 
What intrigues Zi:lek in Hegel's articulation of the subject as negativity is how 
it links up with the Kantian pedagogical concepts such as "unruliness" and "diabolic 
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evil." Insofar as the latter indicates, for Zizek, that the zero-level of human subjectivity 
is in some sense non-natural, it shows that the various Hegelian descriptions of spirit in 
concepts such as "abstract negativity," "tarrying with the negative"28 and the "night of 
the world"29 point to its basis in a disruption from the closed-circuitry of the 
homoeostatic laws of nature. His claim is that we normally overlook something crucial 
in Hegel's account of the dialectical movement from the first, dull, inarticulate stirrings 
of spirit into full-fledged self-consciousness subjectivity. What Zizek's Hegel adds to 
the Kantian notion of the transcendental constitution of experience is a gesture 
towards its ontogenetic conditions, a glimpse into how the spectral pandemonium of 
the pre-logical Real we see in "unruliness" precedes and makes possible the autonomy 
of the cogito. What this means is that prior to the self-legislative laws of practical reason 
and the synthesis of imagination that constitutes the unity of phenomenal reality, we 
must posit some kind of ontological going haywire that represents a savage tearing apart 
of the immanent flow of vital being.30 The chaotic aggregate of ghastly forms and 
shapes which constitutes the quasi-phenomenological self-experience shown in the 
unruliness of the human organism is nothing other than another logical modality of 
transcendental imagination, its most originary expression. It is this vital hemorrhage of 
28 See Hegel, Phenomenology qf Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 19. 
29 See Hegel, ':Jenaer Realphilosophie," in Friik politisck Systeme (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1974), p. 204; 
quoted in Donald Philip Verene, Hegel's Recollection (Albany: SUNY Press 1985), p. 7-8 and by Ziiek 
TS 29-30. For a discussion, see AF 4-14 and TS 26-48. As we shall see, Schelling radicalizes this. 
30 "The pre-synthetic Real, its pure, not-yet-fashioned "multitude" not yet synthesized by a minimum 
of transcendental imagination, is, stricto sensu, impossible: a level that must be retroactively 
presupposed, but can never actually be encountered. Our (Hegelian) point, however, is that this 
mythical/impossible starting point, the presupposition of imagination, is already the product, the 
result of, the imagination's disruptive activity. In short, the mythic, inaccessible zero-level of pure 
multitude not yet affected/ fashioned by imagination is nothing but pure imagination itself, imagination 
at its most violent, as the activity of disrupting the continuity of the inertia of the pre-symbolic 
"natural" Real. This pre-synthetic "multitude" is what Hegel describes as the "night of the world," 
as the "unruliness" of the subject's abyssal freedom which violenlly explodes reality into a dispersed 
floating of membra disjecta." (TS 33) 
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nature that prevents the ideality of the subject from being subsumed the within self-
actualizing of the Absolute and proclaims its primordial irreducibility and 
incommensurablity to positive being. 
Hegel is the one who makes the first crucial step towards elaborating the true 
ground of the subject by demonstrating that it is this haywire dysfonctioning of substance 
that makes the subject incommensurate with material being and renders possible 
freedom in the truly "idealist" sense of the word. Hegel's account of the "I" out of 
nature is the first to explicitly implicate the eruption of an extirnacy that afterwards 
cannot be recontained within the oneness of the Absolute. There is no smooth union, 
no ultimate self-penetrating identity within the fabric of pervasive being: "Substance 
designates the 'imperfection' of Substance, the inherent gap, self-deferral, distance-
from-itself, which forever prevents Substance from fully realizing itself, from becoming 
'fully itself" (AF 7). Subject, therefore, has no positwe substrate: the zero-level of human 
freedom is a blockage, a mistake in the mechanics of nature. The claim is that, without 
the articulation of this ontological place of self-relating negativity (Todestrieb) as 
emerging immanently within being, all accounts of human freedom risk its 
reductionist-monistic cancelation. For Zizek, this is the only coherent 
conclusion:"[t]here are two options here: either subjectivity is an illusion, or reality 
itself (not only epistemologically) is not-All" (PV 168). 
One thing should be clear at this juncture. Although Zizek's Hegel glimpses the 
foundational basis of the spontaneity of the pure "I" that precedes the transcendental 
constitution of the fabric of experiential reality, he cannot account for one thing: the 
immanent generation if irreducible negatWiry within the material flux if substance. How does the 
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vital flow of being itself rupture, how does this extimate core germinate within the Real 
and cause a violent explosion which forever precludes the ontological fullness and 
unity of the Real, thus making it barred, nothing but a series of membra d4jecta 
(scattered fragments)? How exactly does the Hegelian night of the world come about? 
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Chapter 11- The Logic qf Transcendental Materialism 
In this chapter I will demonstrate why Zizek needs to go beyond Hegel in order 
to articulate a crucial dialectical moment of his parallax ontology. First I will outline 
Hegel's attempt to think Substance as Subject by focusing on Zizek criticisms of the 
Hegelian mature logic. Then, I will illustrate the structural parallels between 
Schelling's concept of disease and evil and Zizek's account of the eruption of freely 
existing subjectivity, while drawing heavily upon Adrian Johnston's description of the 
emergence of desire in the Stuttgart Lectures. My aim is to show how ZiZek's philosophy 
is radically dependent upon Schellingian ontology in order to articulate the notion of 
metaphysical breakdown so crucial to his own transcendental materialism, and thereby 
establish the neglected place of Schelling in Zizek's thinking. 
The night of the world is merely a kind of description, a haphazard glance 
into, the disarray and pandemonium that precedes the transcendental reconstitution of 
reality into a (relatively) unified fabric of experience. It does not itself explain the 
primordial moment of withdrawal from complete immersion in the positive order of 
being that signals the birth of irreducible subjectivity. In order to comprehend this 
movement, we must first plunge into the immanent pulsation of the vital ebb and flow 
of being itself in order to see how it sets the stage for the subject, a movement, which 
Zizek explicitly says, is most acutely developed in Schelling: 
Kant was the first to detect this crack in the ontological edifice of 
reality: if (what we experience as) "objective reality" is not simply given 
"out there," waiting to be perceived by the subject, but a artificial 
composite constituted through the subject's active participation- that is, 
through the act of transcendental synthesis - then the question crops up 
sooner or later: what is the status of the uncanny X that precedes the 
transcendentally constituted reality? F. WJ. Schelling gave the most 
detailed account of this X in his notion of the Ground of Existence - of 
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that which "in God Himself is not yet God:" the "divine madness," the 
obscure pre-ontological domain of "drives," the pre-logical Real that 
forever remains the elusive Ground of Reason that can never be 
grasped "as such," merely glimpsed in the very gesture of its 
withdrawal. (TS 55) 
This, however, creates a problem internally within Zizek's texts insofar as he 
describes his own project time and time again as Hegelian and never as Schellingian. If, 
as will become apparent, it is Schelling that is the philosopher who most fully describes 
the material ontogenetic conditions for the emergence of the subject (rather than 
Hegel), Zizek's critique of Schelling demonstrates some kind of error, inconsistency or 
slight of hand. Zizek not only fails to give any systematic argumentation for the 
superiority of Schelling over Hegel in terms of the obscure origins of the "I," he also 
at times levels off the differences between the two insofar as he is evidently reading 
them reciprocally through each other. Here I am thinking specifically of his endeavour 
in The Parallax View to show that, "far from posing an irreducible obstacle to dialectics, 
the notion of the parallax gap provides the key which enables us to discern its 
subversive core. To theorize this parallax gap properly is the necessary first step in the 
rehabilitation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism" (4). This idea of an internal 
insurmountablity in the immanent movement of the dialectic, the necessity of positing 
the non-coincidence and irreducibility of its moments to one another in order for it to 
function, has a more manifest affinity to Schellingian logic, which, developed as a 
response to Hegelian self-mediating Notion, centred around the idea of the indivisible 
remainder, der nie atifgehende Reste, as an irremovable snag in every logical system that 
guarantees its vitality. Zizek appears, therefore, in many ways to be interpreting 
H egelianism retroactively through Schelling (which would, for example, explain his 
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comments on the irremovable element of parallax over notional interpenetration as 
the "perverse" truth of Hegelian logic). This suggests that the core of his philosophy is 
a hybridism of Schellingianism and Hegelianism. 
The question that imposes itself is the following: At what point is Zizek's own 
theory of the subject Schellingian or Hegelian? The very posing of this question is 
relatively misleading within the context of Zizek's "reactualization" of the tradition 
insofar as what interests him is not Kant, Schelling or Hegel as particular historical 
thinkers with different theoretical concerns per se, but rather, a truth that is self-unfolding 
throughout their works, a truth inaugurated by the Cartesian cogito and which culminates in 
psychoanalysis. However, even if what intrigues Zizek is the specific Grundlogik driving 
the tradition, we can nevertheless demonstrate the priority of Schelling by showing 
how Schelling helps fill in a theoretical void opened up by Hegel and therefore 
radicalizes the foundational insight of German Idealism. 
What is clear from Zizek's version of the Hegelian attempt to think Substance 
as Subject is that what remains underdeveloped is the essence of that impossible X 
which eternally precedes the "I" remains under developed Although Hegel articulates 
the fundamental paradoxes that arise out of the ontologization of transcendental 
imagination, Zi:lek clearly expresses this general dissatisfaction in his discussion of 
Hegel's philosophy of nature in The Ticklish Subject. Since this text is written cifler his 
major work on Schelling The Indivisible Remainder; it would appear that Zi:lek's critical 
reading of Hegel and its account of the passage to culture is based on the 
presuppositions that guide his own transcendental materialism, which obviously have 
their origins in his crucial work on Schelling published only three years earlier. His 
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dissatisfaction is an implicit demonstration of the prioritization and theoretical 
supremacy of Schellingian ontology within his theorization of the parallax. 
Pointing to what he takes as an ambiguity that persists within Hegel's account 
of the dialectical movement from self-contained Notion, to nature and then to spirit in 
his mature logic, Zizek suggests that Hegel was unable to bring into conceptual fullness 
the groundbreaking realization that he was on the verge of articulating?' What is left 
aside is, strictly speaking, the night of the world that Hegel's earlier Realphilosophie had 
uncovered. In the mature logic, it is uncertain how this radical self-relating negativity, 
this moment of irreducible ontological breakdown, truly fits in. Instead of the 
precarious, never-to-be-complete "reconciliation" between nature and finite spirit as 
we see in the Realphilosophie (due to the abyssal void of the subject), culture itself 
becomes a closed circuit, a complete return of the Idea to itself out of its self-
outsidedness in nature, which completely does away with the "psychotic" contraction 
into Self. The "here shoots a bloody head, there another ghostly apparition," 
disappears and subject as the irreconcilable In-between of nature and culture, the 
bone in the throat of substance, loses all currency. 
For Zizek, there are thus two forms of Hegelian dialectics: either we have the 
perfect dialectical triad of the mature system (Logic ---7 Nature ---7 Spirit), or a non-
closed quadruple which signals the self-collapse of dialectical logic itself of 
Realphilosophie (Logic ---7 Nature ---7 finite Spirit ---7 objective/ naturalized Spirit) (TS 82). 
In Zizekian ontology, the triad is thus, strictly speaking, incomplete. It is inconsistent with 
its true earlier breakthrough. At the most basic level, culture can never completely 
31 See Ziiek, Chapter 2, "The Hegelian Ticklish Subject," TS, specifically the section entitled "3, 4, 
5," p. 79-86. 
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sursume32 the infinite contraction into the Self and simply make it a sublimated 
moment in the self-meditation of the Notion: there must always be a minimal distance 
between the unruliness of human nature, the withdrawal into nocturnal Innenwelt 
(inner world) of the Soul that is the primordial basis of human subjectivity, and the 
symbolic, cultural network that attempts to discipline this unnatural violence into a 
second nature. The two can never overlap so that the latter encompasses the former or 
presents an all-pervasive totality, insofar as this levels out the singulariry that marks 
human subjectivity, the fact that it cannot be fully subsumed or explained by material 
and cultural determinations. 
For Zizek, the difference between traditional accounts of Absolute Idealism 
and the quadruple dialectic of the Realphilosophie demonstrates the nature of dialectical 
logic he wants to defend. Whereas the former can be understood as a series of upward 
moving spirals where each new turn completely encompasses the previous so that 
eventually we have a completely enclosed, organic totality, the very self-unfolding 
operation of the later precludes the possibility of such a self-totalizing activity. 
Although Absolute Idealism itself does move forward on the basis of a fundamental 
non-coincidence or immanent contradiction (there is conflict internal to the system), it 
is always ultimately productive of new, more comprehensive unity. Within 
transcendental materialism, however, the passage from nature to culture does not 
reveal a struggle of transmutation, but an irrevocable standstill in the heart of being 
that cannot be sublated into a higher moment of truth: the immanent breakdown 
within the ebb and flow of substance ontogenetically creates an irreducible subject 
32 In this thesis, I have decided to use "sursume" to translate "aufheben" on the basis of a trend in 
French translations of Hegel. In the context of this piece, it has the advantage of avoiding 
ambiguities which could arise with the normal translation of "sublate," a concept that has its own 
unique psychoanalytical meaning, and does not fall into the trap of "subsume." 
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only through its autodisruptive movement. This means that the process of 
subjectivation (culture) emerges out of the negativity of the pure "I" and thus holds a 
position of radical autonomy over nature. Instead of a self-enclosed spiral or circle of 
circles, we see a "break" in nature which prevents the next dialectical phase of self-
appropriation from occurring, from which are derived two radically different areas of 
autonomous activity. The image is of two cones - one ontologically positive, the other 
immersed in a virtual zone of non being- linked together by a black hole that is the 
subject. Nature and culture self-actualize in isolation to one another, but are 
nevertheless negatively linked together by the abyssal void of subjectivity, that which 
"protrudes" out of both. It stands for the throat of substance that prevents the 
Absolute from being a devouring all that operates according to its self-unfolding 
immanent laws,33 just as much as it stands for that snag in the cultural machine (the 
kernel of the Real) that can never be filled in and thus is the impetus for the infinite 
proliferation of new symbolic, cultural forms.34 Here we have a rich account of the 
emergence of various autonomous zones of activity which remain irreducible to although 
simultaneously dependent on the precedent levels which constitute their genetic 
ground. To any one familiar with the Freiheitsshcri.fl or the Weltalter, this demonstrates 
the manifest Schellingian character of Zizek's criticism of Hegel (with an important 
twist), while at the same time locating the germ of the former's logic of the Grund 
33 For Ziiek, "this is in fact the crucial achievement of psychoanalysis: its claim is that that sexuality 
itself, sexual drives pertaining to the human animal, cannot be accounted for in evolutionary terms" 
(PV 16 7). The subject is always a leftover, something which sticks out and protrudes from the natural 
and cultural world. 
34 One must remember, that since the Symbolic is never all for Lacan, the true core of Hegelian 
dialectical logic for ZiZek is that it must include an irremovable moment of irreconcilability and 
non-coincidence, an interruptive and ideally devastating "In-between" position. Bruce Fink refers to 
this as "kinks in the symbolic order," that which prevents the symbolic constitution and yet keeps it 
going. See Chapter 3, "The Creative Function of the Word: The Symbolic and the Real," in The 
Lacanian Subject (New York: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 24-31. 
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within Hegel's early Realphilosophie.35 
Accordingly, what is so interesting within Zizek's reactualization of German 
Idealism is its implicit claim that Schelling's radical "departure" from the throes of 
reason in the Weltalter does not demonstrate a break from the thrust of modern 
philosophy inaugurated by Descartes, but is, in some sense, its "perverse" truth. 
Schelling's attempt to present a logical system that would be able to combat what he 
perceived as the horrifying "pan-logicism" of Hegelian dialectics is actually a 
radicalization, a completion, of its fundamental insight. In terms of the discussion above, 
therefore, it is Schelling and not Hegel who gives the fullest articulation of the 
dialectical movement that leads to the birth of the subject insofar as it is he who 
outlines the basis of a quadruple logic, whereas Hegel, going against his own initial 
tendencies, apparently falls back into a triad at a crucial moment and loses the 
radicalness of the subject. What thus characterizes the passionate fury of the middle-
late period is its embrace, its giving itself over to, the paradoxes that constitute the 
metaphysical basis of subjectivity - the essence of ontological unruliness as the ground 
of freedom, transcendental human spontaneity as linked to the libidinal frenzy of the 
Todestrieb, and the theory of nature which they implicate, the dark chaos of the Real 
that precedes and exceeds consciousness, thereby renders impossible the primacy of 
self-mediating, self-transparent reason. Interpreting the Weltalter through this frame, 
Zizek is then able to appropriate this logic into his own transcendental materialism. 
First and foremost, the Weltalter manuscripts understand themselves as a 
theosophic exploration of the birth of God. Perceiving Hegelian Logic as a purely 
35 The entirety of the parallax logic that Zizek is, in effect, an attempt to fully articulate and bring into 
conceptual fullness Schelling's logic of the Grund. See FS 227 for Schelling's description of his logic 
as a kind of relative autonomy that exists through dependence. 
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conceptual artifice that suffocates the freedom not only of God but also of humanity 
under the self-actualizing necessity of the Notion, Schelling applies his philosophical 
prowess to give his own account of emergence of temporality and finitude that could 
rival that of his great adversary. His basic thesis is that, although Hegelian Logic can 
express notional necessity (what something ideally is), it ultimately fails to grasp the fact 
of being, the primordial basis of its raw reality in freedom, something which forever 
eludes the self-mediation of conceptuality. For Schelling however, this is not a 
admittance of the intrinsic limitations of knowledge and human reason. It must be 
distinguished from Kantian Critical Philosophy because this dialectical deadlock does 
arise not due to the finite synthesizing activity of the subject, the impasse of the 
conditions of the possibility of knowledge, but through a logically disruptive and yet 
positively productive metaphysical activity; that is to say, the epistemic deficiency, the 
notional snag, announced by the indivisible remainder as the incomprehensible basis 
in reality is caused through the radical incompletion of reality rendered necessary by 
the fact of irreducible freedom. It is not merely that we are ignorant of a totalizing 
principle or cause which holds being together: freedom proclaims that there is not any, 
that there could not be any. In trying to systematize freedom, Schelling reaches a 
contradiction - a contradiction that is, paradoxically, the very vitality of the system 
itself, insofar as the totality of being must be understood in terms of an immanent and 
constitutive conflictual relation with its other: "Were the first nature in harmony with 
itself, it would remain so. It would be constantly One and would never become Two. It 
would be an eternal rigidity without progress" (WAIII 219). The central conceptual 
work and theoretical concern of the Weltalter is to outline the necessary snag in the 
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dialectical machine, the primordial unruly excess of the real over the ideal as that which 
prevents system from being static, self-enclosed unto itself and guarantees its 
dynamism by making it inclusive of freedom at its very core. 
In order to situate ourselves more firmly within the dialectical radicalness of 
Schelling's Weltalter and show how, in relation to the structure of Zizek's ontology, it 
therefore holds a position of theoretical primacy over Hegel, we can use the problem 
of evil as an entry point, since it is perhaps in Hegel's and Schelling's respective 
theories thereof that they most strongly distances themselves from each other. Whereas 
for Hegel evil becomes merely a sursumed moment in the self-development of the 
Good, a necessary phase for its establishment, for Schelling evil remains at its very core 
irrational, illogical- by definition it cannot be sublated as a moment within a higher 
dialectical standpoint because it is, at its primordial basis, the effect of an irreducible 
act of will. There is something spontaneous about the choice for evil which forever 
eludes our concepts of understanding, something insurmountable about the unruliness 
of a soul that insists on that which it wants and will sacrifice whatever it can in order to 
achieve it. There is something crazed, frantic, and psychotic about it: evil is the 
capacity to say "No" with the full knowledge of the implications of one's action. 
As soon as evil is understood and conceptualized, it fails to be evil - it becomes, 
rather, misguided good in the Platonic sense that no one does wrong willingly. Hence 
Schelling's articulation of freedom as the possibility for good and evil: freedom in itself 
must rest radically incomprehensible, analogous to a self-chosen, self-posited gesture 
that can only resemble madness insofar as it precedes and makes possible the articulation of 
a table of values and by itself cannot be subsumed by them. It of itself knows no 
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order, no rationality. There is always something essentially impenetrable in a free act 
That is to say, insofar as the act itself is concerned, both the modalities of good and 
evil as expressions of freedom are formally identical insofar as they involve the choice of 
a set of values without a~ry guarantee and without a~ry external determination. What this suggests 
is that evil is itself at the core of every good act: in order for an act to be truly good and 
authentically free at the same time, it must "pass" through evil, discipline it, and use it as 
the tamed Grund for its own expansive power.36 In this sense, the Schellingian concept 
of freedom is an explicit rethinking of the Kantian notion of diabolic evil and its 
related concept of the original "unnatural" unruliness of the human organism as that 
which precedes and constitutes the condition of the possibility of autonomy, so that 
these concepts become an intrinsic part of his own logic of the Grund. 
It is this conviction of the irreducibility of free decision that leads Schelling 
into the abyssal labyrinths of self-exploration that constitute the conceptual fabric of 
the Weltalter. In the same way the intuition of freedom made Kant limit knowledge in 
order to make room for faith and articulate diabolic evil and unruliness in his 
pedagogical writings. The main motivation for Schelling was to battle against what he 
perceives as'the ultimate downfall of Hegelian dialectics which, in his opinion, is how 
it completely overlooks, neglects and levels out the anarchic element of subjectivity. For 
Zizek, therefore, it is not an accident that Schelling's own descriptions of the vortex of 
Triebe (drives) which precede the spoken Word are remarkably similar in spirit to 
Hegel's descriptions of the night of the world: both are driven by an attempt to give a 
philosophically adequate bedrock to Kantian freedom. 
Using the operative logic that he had already programmatically developed in 
36 See WAIII 217. 
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the Freiheitsschrijl as a guide or outline, Schelling utilizes a specific form of introspective 
analysis to develop a theosophy, the guiding intuition of which is that same process 
which underlies the birth of human subjectivity is ultimately structurally identical to 
God's creation of the world. In another vein, the idea is that psychological experience is 
in some sense directly revelatory of the Real, even ifit must pass through the meditating 
filters of self-reflexive consciousness; the experience of the autonomous, yet dependent 
relationship between one's pre-subjective, material Gmnd and the matrices which 
constitute personality is primordially disclosive of an ontological occurrence that is a 
symbol of God's relation to the finite created world. But because the methodological 
starting point is similar to the psychoanalytical experience of disharmony/freedom, 
Zizek is lead to discard the entire theosophic scope of the work as ultimately 
accidental to its " true" core, so that the structure of divine creation according to 
Schelling presents itself as a "metapsychological work in the strict Freudian sense of the 
term" (ID 9). Whether or not Zizek himself is justified in completely removing the 
theosophic scope from Schelling's argument, at the very least Zizek's move follows the 
spirit of Schelling's middle-late philosophy, insofar as Schelling himself declares in the 
Freiheitsschrifl to "have established the first clear concept of personality" (281 ). 
What interests Zizek is merely the status of this elusive X, theje ne sais quoi, 
which haunts transcendentally constituted reality, precedes it, in some radical manner 
appears to constitute its condition of possibility, and how these three conceptual 
aspects of its appearance are interconnected. These three conceptual aspects of the X 
asje ne sais quoi map unto three modalities of the Real: (i) Real as a "kink" in the 
Symbolic, a snag in the dialectical machine; (ii) Real as pre-symbolic immediacy which 
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is lost through the advent of language; and (iii) Real (R) as autodisruptive substance 
(N:i=N) whose self-laceration creates the necessary ontogenetic space within which the 
transcendental reconstitution (the Symbolic-Imaginary matrices of self-experience) of 
reality can emerge, which somehow grounds the first two. Prior to these middle-late 
works of Schelling, our relation to this mysterious X had already been partially 
"schematized" by a list of concepts, as we have seen - from Kantian transcendental 
freedom and unruliness to the Hegelian accounts of the night of the world and 
substance as subject. However, for Zizek, it is only with Schellling's own dialectical 
additions that we move away from the paradoxes of the ideal representation of the 
extrasubjective world or a glimpse into the ontological breakdown that precedes it, and 
plunge into the autodisruptive logic of the pre-symbolic Real. The difficulty, however, 
is how to articulate a philosophical system which attempts to synthesize these various 
concepts together into a stable whole insofar as the very ontological space whose 
exploration would enable this retreats the very moment that conscious experiences 
begins. As Zi:Zek says in the opening of his book on Schelling, the problem that haunts 
the entire book is: 
... the problem if the Beginning itself, the central problem of German 
Idealism - suffice it to recall Hegel's detailed elaboration of this 
problem and all its implications in the Science if Logic. Schelling's 
'materialist' contribution is best epitomized by his fundamental thesis 
according to which, to put it bluntly, the true Beginning is not at the beginning: 
there is something that precedes the Beginning itself - a rotary motion 
whose vicious cycle is broken, in a gesture analogous to the cutting of 
the Gordian knot, by the Beginning proper, that is, the primordial act of 
decision. The beginning of all beginnings, the beginning kat' exohen -
the "mother of all beginnings," as one would say today - is, of course, 
the "In the beginning was the Ubrci" from the Gospel according to StJohn. 
According to Schelling, however, "eternity" is not a nondescript mass -
a lot of things take place int it. Prior to the Word there is the chaotic-
psychotic universe of blind drives, their rotary motion, their 
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undifferentiated pulsating; and the Beginning occurs when the Word is 
pronounced which "repressed," rejects into the eternal Past, this self-
enclosed circuit of drives. (ID 13) 
Schelling demonstrates a remarkable insight into the immanent, thriving forces 
of the extra-/pre-subjective, material Real, the elusive, obscure phase of darkness that 
precedes and constitutes the birth of the light of consciousness. But "What intrigues 
Zizek is the radicalness, the depth, of his materialist response to Hegel, which still 
remains immersed in the fabric of transcendental idealism. This is why Zizek describes 
Schelling as a vanishing meditator between classical philosophy and the contemporary 
discourse of finitude: Schelling stands in a position of irreconcilable contradiction, of 
infinite parallax, between the two. It is this tension that Zi:lek takes it himself to 
further develop and articulate in a different way in his parallax ontology. If we 
superimpose unto the ground/ existence distinction, which Schelling propounds in the 
Freiheitsschrijl and the "Weltalter, the real(ity)/ideal(ity) distinction that is operative within 
modern philosophy from Descartes onward, we perceive a nuance in the 
ontologization/ grounding of the subjectivity: this split announced between mind and 
matter, which makes them non-reconcilable to one another, occurs "within" or ccon the side 
qf" the material Real through an ontologico-metapi!Jsical deadlock, a schismatic rupture. The 
standard debate between idealism (ideality precedes and structurally makes possible 
the positive order of being) and materialism (there is nothing but the ebb and flow of 
matter) is thus split on its head: 
idealism posits an ideal Event which cannot be accounted for in terms 
of its material (pre)conditions, while the materialist wager is that we can 
get "behind" the event and explore how Event explodes out of the gap 
in/ of the order of Being. The first to formulate this task was Schelling, 
who, in his "Weltalter fragments, outlined the dark territory of the 
'prehistory of Logos,' of what had to occur in preontological 
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protoreality so that openness of Logos and temporality could take 
place.37 (PV 166) 
So how, then, do the pulsations of pure, raw materiality open up unto the 
irreducible event of the ideal? What one notices in Schelling's philosophy from the 
beginning to the end is a breath-taking and sustained ability to penetrate into nature as 
something which exceeds and preceeds consciousness. 38 His articulation of the primacy of 
the physical as the material, extrasubjective reality in order to explain the genesis or 
emergence of experience (which, in this period, also applies to the ground of God's 
self-consciousness in his theosophic narrative, hence the identity between the birth of 
consciousness and the creation of the world) does not on the surface seem so 
disconnected and unique in terms of the corpus of his writings. Indeed, the opening 
pages of the second draft of the Weltalter show us that, when Schelling plunges into this 
metaphysical zone of reality that existed before the upsurge of the pure "I," he is 
doing nothing other than attempting to approach the self-unfolding core of materiality 
that constitutes the indwelling logic of nature, which situates the entire project within 
his own attempts at a Naturphilosophie. The last paragraph of the Freiheitsschrifl only 
confirms this. He is searching for a full intuition of the magic of the Eternal Past of 
consciousness as nature acting as Grund. 39 
Zi.Zek's takes Schellingian nature as more than a symbol, a representation of 
the Eternal Past that precedes consciousness, but as that elusive, impossible X of the 
pre-symbolic Real. This suggests that we have some direct contact with the 
extrasubjective world, direct contact with substance qua substance outside of the 
37 For a further discussion, see PV166-1667. 
38 Although one is tempted to say that the late philosophy is an exception, this is not at all evident, 
specifically insofar as in 1844, with Presentation of the Process of Nature, Schelling tries to define the 
positive philosophy in in terms of the logic of nature. 
39 For a discussion, see WAII116. 
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meditation of language. When we move outside of the world of human meaning and 
into the self-enclosed circuitry of the vital ebb and flow of nature, we see that 
"everything that surrounds us points back to a past of incredibly grandeur. The oldest 
formations of the earth bear such a foreign aspect that we are hardly in a position to 
form a concept of their time or origin or of the forces that were then at work" (WAll 
121). The crucial observation to be made here is not that nature has a history which 
self-unfolds through an activity of internal self-transmutation (whether this be placid 
and smooth or implying an neverending strife of opposites) that is inclusive of man. 
There are, of course, stages, eons, varying levels of dynamic evolution and interaction 
within the immanent activity of material nature. Yet, when we look around, we cannot 
find the subject within the teleological totality of nature. It does not fit: the peculiarity 
of human subjectivity represents an irreconcilable break with the autopoesis of nature, a 
self-legislative spontaneity that defines itself in direct opposition to its self-organizing 
totality. Human history begins with a repression or cutting off of immemorial natural 
history. 
Ziiek tries to base this on the fact that, when we witness the genealogy of 
natural history in the Weltalter, we realize that nature is not the unconscious proper. 
Strictly speaking, nature is nonconscious. We only see a pulsation of matter, a circular, 
rotary movement of contraction and expansion that follows its own mechanistic, 
automatic rhythm- what we see knows no time, no linear temporality; it merely 
eternally repeats in an infinite, self-enclosed cycle of life and death, day and night, 
fullness and lack. Outside of it, there is nothing - everything is caught within an 
agonizing deadlock. There is no room for free movement. For Ziiek, we get a sense of 
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this all-devouring force when we look inside the body and specifically the skull. This 
raw flow of biochemical and electrical energy is so "terrifying" for him because it is 
faceless - it has absolute nothing to do with the orbit of phenomenal experience or the human universe 
of meaning. There is merely the anonymous, dull palpitations that resemble the 
industrial buzzing of automatic machinery, a machinery that may amaze us with its 
complexity and dynamism, but which nevertheless exists as a closed circle locked 
within its own self-enclosed movement, which is not only greater than us, but 
"threatens" our very existence as subjects at every step. The ego "sits enthroned over a 
world of terrors" (VVA ill 49). But this is not to suggest that the irreducible gap 
between our phenomenal experience and the mechanisms of the natural world 
proclaims the irrelevance of contemporary neurobiology and cognitivism for 
understanding the fullness of human subjectivity, as perhaps various representatives of 
phenomenological psychiatry or psychoanalysis would advocate; on the contrary, for 
Zizek they adequately describe the Real of our lives with a rigorous vigour and 
precision before unimaginable. Zizek criticizes various attempts to respond to the 
threat announced by neurobiology concerning the irreducible character of the subject, 
seeing the only feasible way to find a solution to develop its logic "to its extreme," to 
follow its discourse "at its purest" (PV 1 7 5). The question is how a parallax gap, an 
irreducible negativity, could emerge from within the neuronal interface inside the skull. 
What we will see is just how much Zizek's own recent endeavour to outline how in 
contemporary cognitive science "the 'mental' itself explodes within the neuronal 
through a kind of 'ontological explosion'" is influenced from his engagement with 
Schelling (PV 211 ). 
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Within the elusive X of nature, when we look around at the immemorial 
epochs of geological time, the evolutionary strata of biological autodevelopment or the 
dynamism of libidinal economics, there is nothing but a devouring blind necessity. 
Insofar as this self-totalizing immanent causality represents a closed circle, how is this 
deterministic "deadlock" surpassed so that free movement is possible? Although 
Zizek's own descriptions in The Indivisible Remainder and "The Abyss of Freedom" of 
the passage from the rotary movement of Triebe to a subject that is non-coincident with 
its material Grund, focus on the founding gesture of subjectivity as a fiat, this is not 
enough. The question is how the id-like pulsation of the drivesgroundr the self-positing 
act of the decision. As Adrian johnston makes astonishingly clear, even if the self-
positing act of the subject ir an arbitrary, groundless act "analogous to the cutting of 
the Gordian knot," Schelling searches for a way to inscribe the very condition of the 
possibility of the act itself within the material palpitations of nature in works for the 
most part not discussed by Zi:lek.w In this sense, Zizek's own account is dissatisfYing 
because it has a tendency to present the drives as an irrevocably closed system of blind 
determinism without specifically explaining how they, of themselves, short circuit (a 
theoretical emphasis that would be advantageous to his overall attempt to ground a 
new materialist ontology). 
Asjohnston points out, within the Schellingian ontogenetic narrative, the self-
positing of the subject is first possiblized by the emergence of desire (Begierde) within 
being. Desire marks the first juncture of some kind of blockage in the heart of blind 
necessity, some kind of immanently generated intrusion, which obfuscates the 
automatic oscillation of drives by shattering its pure immanence. In place of a smooth, 
40 See Johnston ZO, Chapter 7, "Substance Against Itself: The Disturbing Vortex of Trieb.," p. 80-92. 
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determined relation to the environment wholly programmed by instincts (the 
coincidence of Innenwelt and Aussenwelt through a predetermined set of biological 
schemata that hardwire the organism into its "exterior" surroundings), we get a degree 
of liberation from the various sense data of perception which normally determine an 
organism's actions mechanically. Desire in its Schellingian mode is thus mainly an 
intermediary stage between instinct and drive within the ontogenesis of the 
transcendental "I." But what must be noted here is how desire, as the beginning of the 
idealization of reality, is essentially identical to the conventional definitions of 
psychosis. Consequently, it is Schelling and not Hegel who most succinctly describes the 
ontological passage through madness insofar as it is the former who describes how the 
night of the world disrupts the world into a series of membra disjecta. 
The Zizekian night of the world emerges as the nonconscious drives of nature 
for the first time liberate themselves from the blind necessity of being through an 
immanently generated pandemonium within the corpo-Real of the body. Properly 
speaking, desire is an impasse within the ontological life of substance - "[s]ince there is 
consequently an unremitting urge to be and since it cannot be, it comes to a standstill 
in desire, as an unremitting striving, an eternally insatiable obsession with Being" 
(WAIII 21) - which prevents it from devouring, encompassing, all, because the organism 
now obeys its own nonnatural logic. Here, the analogue with the body is useful to 
perceive the radicalness of Zi:lek's appropriation of Schelling. Although the biological 
unity of the corpo-Real can astound us with its organic dynamism, the very awing 
force of this self-organizing totality can cast a shadow over its dark underbelly. This a 
fact often betrayed by the mindless proliferation of cancerous tumours, muscular 
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dystrophy, and emergence various forms of mental illnesses caused by pure organic 
dysfunction, a fact which demonstrates how, from within the closed totality of a 
determinist system, a part can assert itself from within and hegemonize the organic 
whole, restructuring it according to its own "unruly'' whim. Even if everything is 
logically pre-determined (for example, the ebb and flow of matter can only follow 
certain paths carved out by genetics, the neuronal interface of the brain, and various 
different natural systems), the laws that normally regulate and sustain the body can, of 
themselves, immanently generate a (bio)logical short circuit, thereby opening up a 
negative space within its corpo-Real that can assert itself as such and reek havoc over 
its self-governing unity through a glitch. Like an illness or disease within Schellingian 
logic, desire does not stand for a positive ontological unity (it has no substantial being 
in and of itself) in any way for Zizek, but, rather an internal scrambling of the 
biological circuitry of a system (which, as a false unity, represents an ontological 
collapse, a distortion of being) that does not follow its supposed path within the whole 
and instead stubbornly asserts its own Self at all costs - even its own downfall by 
cutting away the life-stream that keeps it in being.41 
As the force of desire is raised to a higher degree of ideality, matter enters 
into a self-lacerating rage (sich selbst zereijJende Wut) like a cancer-ridden, disease-stricken 
body, howling under its own out-of-control energy.42 Desire is a violent self-destructive 
mania that tears apart the smooth fabric of the world. This is why Ziiek finds Schelling's 
"Wagnerian" vision of God so terrifying. It represents a nature which, through the full 
amplification of desire into Todestrieb, becomes denaturalized: "[t]he horror of the rotary 
41 In the IndWisible Remairui", Ziiek talks of J acq ues-Alain Miller's remarks on an unsettling rat 
experiment mentioned in one of Lacan's unpublished seminars, where it is only through a kind of 
neurological mutilation that a rat can be made to behave like a human. See. 219-220. 
42 See WAIII9l. 
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motion resides in the fact that it is no longer impersonal: God already exists as One, as 
the Subject who suffers and endures the antagonism of drives" (ID 24). The 
primordial unruliness of human nature and its coequal term diabolical evil are 
therefore synonymous with this grotesque excess of life that we witness in the 
breakdown of the corpo-Real in times of illness.43 The freedom of the subject is not a 
positive characteristic or attribute: it is the failure of autoactualization of essence, its 
inability to contain itself within its own preset logistics, which immanently generates 
an ontological catastrophe: 
<_itek. What I am currently engaged with is the paradoxical idea that, 
from a strict evolutionary standpoint, consciousness is a kind of mistake 
- a malfunction of evolution - and that out of this mistake a miracle 
emerged. That is to say, consciousness developed as an unintended by-
product that acquired a kind of second-degree survivalist function. 
Basically, consciousness is not something which enables us to function 
better. On the contrary, I am more and more convinced that 
consciousness originates with something going terribly wrong- even at 
the most personal level. For example, when do we become aware of 
something, fully aware? Precisely at the point where something no 
longer functions properly or not in the expected way. 
Daly. Consciousness comes about as a result of some Real encounter? 
<_if.ek. Yes, consciousness is originally linked to this moment when 
"something is wrong," or, to put it in Lacanian terms, an experience of 
the Real, of an impossible. limit. Original awareness is impelled by a 
certain experience of failure and mortality - a kind of snag in the 
biological weave. And all the metaphysical dimensions concerning 
humanity, philosophical self-reflection, progress and so on emerge 
ultimately because of this basic traumatic fissure. (CV 59) 
Since Zizek, in some sense or other, situates his own philosophical project 
within the heritage of the philosophical problems plaguing German Idealism, his 
passage from Kantian unruliness and the Hegelian night of the world to the 
Schellingian logic of the Grund is an attempt to show how the subject is not external to 
43 Or, as johnston says, "[t]he surplus of autonomy is made possible by the deficit of heteronomy. 
Freedom emerges from the dysfunctioning of determinism" ZO 114. 
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the Absolute. As a mode of substance itself, it must express for Zizek an interior 
"rupturing" of its pure immanence. The gaze of the subject, therefore, must be seen in 
Zizekian ontology as being the material universe finally "gaining" the power to look 
upon itself through an internal reflection: "the whole domain of the representation of 
the world (call it mind, spirit, language, consciousness, or whatever medium you prefer) 
needs to be understood as an event within and of the world itself Thought is not at all 
opposed to being, it is rather being's replication within itsel£'>14 Yet, when the subject 
finally opens its eyes for the very first time, the world does not celebrate as it glances 
upon itsel£ It whimpers under its own weight while hearing its own inarticulate cry. 
Experiencing itself in a moment of unbearable agony and catastrophic self-diremption 
in "a mixture of terror and perplexity," Zizek compares the event of the emergence of 
the subject to the atrocity of sexual abuse and the horrific pictures of children dying 
from radiation exposure in Chernobyl (PV 73). 
What the world first sees is not its own awe-striking unity and oneness that 
holds everything together in an all-encompassing totality. All it sees is the tumultuous 
uproar of erratic pulsation, an irreconcilable, non-masterable chaos resulting from the 
degradation or collapse of its own productive activity. The self-awareness of the world, 
its self-experience in the first-person in the finite human subject - and, thus, all 
experience - is necessarily preceded by this irreducible and irrevocable autodisruption 
that must be seen as catastrophic. Zizek's argument is that this is a necessary theoretical 
posit if free experience is to be possible instead of a blind experiential void: 
We cannot pass directly from nature to culture. Something goes terribly 
----------------
44 Markus Gabriel & Slavoj Zizek, "Introduction," in Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectiui!J in 
German Idealism (New York: Continuum, 2009), p. 3. In this recently published book both Gabriel and 
Zizek define their mutual projects in terms of the "need [qj] a concept i![ the world or the real which is 
capable I![ account for the replication I![ reali!J within itself' (p. 13). 
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wrong in nature: nature produces an unnatural monstrosity and I claim 
that it is in order to cope with, to domesticate, this monstrosity that we 
symbolize. Taking Freud's fort/ da as a model: something is primordially 
broken (the absence of the mother and so on) and symbolization 
functions as a way of living with that kind of trauma. (CV 64-65) 
The implication, therefore, is that the Symbolic is nothing but an attempt to tame this 
primordial mayhem, but this can only be accomplished at the level of the virtual. This 
ontologico-foundational basis, which is a complex rerendering of the mirror stage, is 
insurmountable: this libidinal chaos remains supreme and never tamed or sublimated 
into a higher metaphysical unity, since otherwise we would be back to a Hegelian 
triadic logic, which according to Ziiekian logic is necessarily incomplete. The passage 
from darkness to light occurs merely at the level of the Symbolic; in the Real, nothing 
changes. It is this aspect of the intrinsic madness of culture, language and phenomenal 
reality, its psychotic lack of contact with the world, that Zizek claims we forget, that we 
must necessarily forget, if the fantasy formation is to be a successful "compensation" 
for the unbearable truth of the radical dismemberment of one's own being. 
Zizek's own ontology, therefore, is an attempt to take various hints within 
Schelling's materialism a step further. Following various marginal hint and gestures in 
texts such as the Frciheitsschrifl and the J.Veltalter, Zizek takes what he sees as 
premonitions of the psychoanalytical experience of the irrevocable discord between 
mind and body and rethinks Schelling's logic of the Grund through them. This leads 
Zizek to the idea of ground and existence as a dialectically irreconcilable pair that 
emerges through the caustic collapse of material being. The paradox that guides the 
entirety of Zizek's own parallax ontology, therefore, is that it is only through this 
ontological catastrophe that the true "miracle" of freedom can emerge, but he relies 
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entirely on Schellingian texts to develop an account of this ontogenetic basis of 
subjectivity. But, matters become more complicated as we shall see in the next chapter, 
insofar as Ziiek is only able to appropriate this category of "metaphysical collapse" 
through exposing and excavating the Hegelian logic of negativity that he sees hidden 
within the second draft of the We/taller. 
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Chapter IlL The A!ryss of the Unconscious 
This chapter will demonstrate that, although Zizek's parallax ontology 
depends upon Schelling's ontology in order to explicate the emergence of the subject, 
Hegel is omnipresent in Zizek's work. We will see that, since Schelling's own account of 
the logic of the Grund has theosophic tendencies that are in contradiction with the 
logic of the Lacanian subject, Zizek is only able to extract a consistent metapsychology 
from Schelling insofar as he can "formalize" or "purify" its content. Perceiving a 
strictly Hegelian structure of self-relating negativity in the exposition of freedom in the 
second draft of the VVeltalter that opens up unto an identification of Grund and 
existence, Zizek internally reconstructs the entire conceptual structure of Schelling's 
text through Hegelian dialectics and psychoanalysis. In the conclusion, I will show how 
this complex hybridism of Hegelianism and Schellingianism allows Zizek to challenge 
traditional accounts of the unconscious and exposes a possible fatal inconsistency in 
the Lacanian category of the Real. 
The ambiguity of the Hegel-Schelling relationship within Ziiek comes from 
his critique of Schellingian logic. Even if Zizek's own parallax ontology is founded 
upon a notion of emergent ontological catastrophe which forms the foundational basis 
of the subject as self-relating negativity, which he largely derives from the VVeltalter, 
Zizek clearly distances himself from the theosophic trajectory of these texts. The issue 
at hand is further complicated by Zizek's division of Schelling's philosophy into three 
distinct and irreconcilable stages, which he finds reflected in three existent drafts of the 
Weltalter.45 Schelling1 is largely co-incidental with his quasi-Spinozistic philosophy of 
Absolute Indifference, where freedom is completely subsumed under the positive order 
45 See ID 35-39. 
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of being. In the first draft this is seen with the explication of freedom as a logical mode 
of necessity within the inner articulation of substance. In Schelling2 of the second 
draft of the Weltalter and the Freiheitsschrijl, we see an interesting twist in terms of how 
the contraction of material being itself is made possible. By conceiving the act of 
contraction itself as ultimately free and self-positing, here Schelling is able to think the 
will-to-contraction (the No) and the will-to-expansion (the Yes) as identical and 
therefore internal to the dynamic of freedom, which makes his thinking approach that 
of Hegel's. For Zizek, this brief period of breakthrough was quickly left behind by 
Schelling3 of the philosophy of mythology and revelation. Here we see a return to pre-
modern "essentialism," which he claims we already see hinted at in the third draft of 
the Weltalter, in which Schelling posits a third principle of synthesis within which 
freedom and determinism are grounded as opposites. 
Because of these tendencies, which explain why Zizek qualifies Schelling as 
the father of "New Age obscurantism" just as much as he is the father of 
contemporary philosophy of finitude, immediately after his provocative reading of 
Schelling in the first chapter of the Indivisible Remainder, Ziiek quickly changes tone and 
argues for the supremacy of Hegelian dialectics over Schellingian logic. Although 
consistent with his interpretation of Schelling, it is simultaneously ambiguous insofar 
as Zitek does not distinguish which Schelling he is arguing against or justify how he is 
able to read the second draft of the Weltalter as a radical and ephemeral rupture that 
"goes farthest in the direction of Freedom" (ID 38). Since, as we have seen, the only 
possible way for freedom to exist for Zizek is through the notion of the irrevocable 
caustic collapse of the ontological, how is Zizek able to see this in the second draft, 
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insofar as it is evidently against the spirit of the rest of Schelling's career, even as he 
sketches it? 
The answer is that in the second draft Zizek sees a distinctively Hegelian 
structure that enables him to develop a metapsychological reading of the text that 
prevents its underlying ontology from succumbing to philosophical commitments 
(reductionistic determinism, theosophy and mysticism) that Lacanian psychoanalysis 
rejects. The claim is that, after the radical ontology of freedom that he had developed 
in the second draft, Schelling immediately recoils from the implications of 
metapsychology through positing a fourth principle of meditation which enables the 
neutral coexistence of Grund and existence through grounding them within the 
Ungrund, as that which precedes them both and is neither one nor the other. Because 
Schelling here understands the freedom of the act of decision (/!:ntscheidung) which 
primordially separates Grund from existence as a return to this abyssal origin of all 
reality, Schelling's philosophy displays a structure of quaternity, which gets articulated 
in his thinking theosophically through a systemization and reconceptionalization of 
Jakob Bohme. But insofar as the second draft displays freedom as a kind of self-
positing activity which identifies Grund (the will-to-contraction, the No) and existence 
(the will-to-expansion, the Yes), Zizek sees the possibility to "formalize" its 
metapsychology by "purifying" it of all extraneous theosophic commitments through 
Hegelian logic. In is in this sense that Zizek's philosophy is a hybridism of Schellingian 
ontology and Hegelian quadruple dialectics of non-reconciliation (which, in a certain 
sense, could be said to be a three and a half, insofar as the abyssal void of subjectivity 
has no ontological value, but represents an irremovable "in-between"). 
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Hegel is the superior logician for Zizek because his dialectics has no need to 
posit a principle of meditation. Although textbook Hegelianism presents the third 
moment of the logic as a kind of synthesis of two previous incompatible and 
incomplete polarities through a cancelation of the falsehood and a preservation of the 
truth contained in each into a higher, more comprehensive dialectical standpoint, 
Zizek thinks this picture misses the radical breakthrough that we see in the movement. 
The third moment itself is only the second insofar as it hegemonically usurps the 
position of the first through the achievement of notional self-reflexivity. The dialectical 
movement from (i) immediacy~ (ii) negation ~ (iii) negation of negation is superior 
not only because there is no return to the first (something irreducibly different and 
operatively new emerges), but also because there is no need to posit something outside 
of the self-movement of negativity to explain the logical process. The negativity of the 
second is inscribed within the first, which only became explicit in the third. 
Within the still-born drafts the Weltalter, Schelling divides the passage from the 
eternal past to the Present into three distinct stages. The immediate problem 
presenting itself to us here is the fact that Schelling's treatises is a theogony, an account 
of the birth of God. In order to read it as a metapsychological theory explaining the 
emergence of subject from the pre-symbolic Real, Zizek has to treat it purely as a 
myth in the form of the Lacanian lamella. Since Schelling's text operates on two levels 
(the theosophic and the metapsychological), I will quickly summarize Zizek's 
presentation of each stage.46 
In the absolute beginning prior to God's contraction of material being and the 
46 In the context of this piece, instead of outlining the various conceptual distinctions and internal 
differences that occur within the three existent drafts of the Weltalter in terms of the movement from 
Past to Present, I will only be dealing with Zizek's own exegesis which centres on the second draft. A 
complete explication of the three drafts is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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blind, annular rotation of drives, there is a joyous nothingness, a pure potentiality that 
exists in timeless, inexhaustible rapture. For Zizek, in contemporary terms this would 
be equivalent to the pure void that exists before the vacuum fluctuation declared by 
quantum cosmology, a nothingness that must be declared positively charged because 
through its (auto)disturbance something emerges. What is of utmost importance here 
is the irreconcilable contrast between this stage and the next: the joyous void of divine 
nonbeing is "breached" by the contraction of finitude and the infinite self-diremption 
of perfection that it entails. This sundering of heavenly symmetry is thus structurally 
identical to the disruption of the oceanic unity of child and mother that supposedly 
precedes the Oedipus complex, the smooth, placid functioning of nature, which is 
skewered by the advent of human subjectivity. 
Mter the contraction of material being, we have what Zizek calls "Schelling's 
grandiose 'Wagnerian' vision of God" (ID 24). Within Schellingian cosmogony, this is 
so "terrifying" because, instead of the endless joy of divine eternity, we have a God as 
subject who finds Himself unfree and caught within the self-lacerating rage of matter. 
To exemplify this point further, Ziiek claims that this corresponds to the unfathomable 
chaos that occurs after the collapse of the wave function leads to the contraction of 
matter into an infinite point of absolute singularity, an incomprehensible upheaval 
where the logic of our known universe breaks down. In terms of a metapsychology, it 
can be read as a mythopoetic description of the ontological short circuit within the 
blind rotation of Triebe which occurs before the eruption of full-fledged subjectivity. 
Finally, we have God who is able to speak the Word and thus overcome the 
deadlock that he found himself lodged within by becoming a full-fledged subject. 
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Ejecting the materiality he had contracted, he bestows upon it an independent 
existence and becomes God the Creator. For Zizek, in physics this corresponds to the 
primordial Big Bang itself, the beginning of our universe. Metapsychologically, in the 
Word we see the unconscious Entscheidung which separates Grund and existence for the 
first time. The Symbolic erupts as an attempt to discipline the unruliness of the 
material of the previous stage, which lacks any self-organizing schemata. 
For Zizek, however, the psychoanalytical problem is that the structure of the 
investigation has the fundamental structure of fantasy.47 In the articulation of the 
absolute beginning, we insert ourselves as a pure gaze into the Real that is prior to our 
own conception, just as if we were to imagine ourselves as a spectator in our funerals 
watching our friends react to our death. If the introspective analysis which leads to the 
discussion of the joyous nothingness that precedes the contraction of being is merely 
an imaginary falsification, how can Ziiek rely on it to propound his own account of 
the subject or parallax ontology? The problem which Zizek faces is one of the pitfalls 
of the Real-as-lack into which Schelling fell: because we can only retroactively posit 
the material origin of subjectivity from within the Symbolic and the Imaginary, the 
descriptions of this natal, abyssal darkness can serve as a mere screen upon which we 
project fantasmatic supplements. By protecting us from the true traumatic Real of our 
being, they lead us away from the psychoanalytical truth. 
It is not merely that that which we are investigating exists beyond the limits of 
conscious experience. The risk is that if our investigation operates on!J on the level of 
phenomenological self-analysis it jeopardizes having all of its significance abolished 
through a reduction to the narcissistic orbit of the Imaginary. Since Ziiek does not 
47 See ID 22. 
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clearly articulate his own solution to this problematic, the matter at hand is how he is 
able to formalize Schelling's philosophy by purifying it from its theosophic content (the 
illusion of an oceanic bliss) by cutting through its psychoanalytical superficiality. In 
order to do this, Zizek relies on the primordiality of the psychoanalytical experience 
and the Hegelian logic of the self-movement of negativity, which he believes allows us 
to reconfigure and reconceptualize Schelling's descriptions of the three stages involved 
in the movement from the Past to the Present and remove this element of fantasy. 
According to psychoanalytical experience, the primordial zero-level fact in the 
passage from the Past to the Present has to be the second stage, the self-lacerating rage 
of matter. The joyous nothingness, which corresponds to the eternal calm of the pure 
immanence of substance that precedes the ontological unruliness in the deadlock of 
drives and the struggle to speak the word, is merely a part of the fundamental fantasy 
of the ego. The claim is that one cannot draw a metaphysical distinction between 
substance as a nothingness that rejoices in the oceanic bliss of non-experience and the 
unruly basis of human subjectivity which "disrupts" this unity. 
For Zizek, the materialist logic that we see premonitions of in the second draft 
allows us to add precision to the German Idealist attempt to think substance as subject. 
The model of the ontogenetic basis of subjectivity as a contraction of a disease within 
the vital fold of being needs to be clarified, insofar as there was never a state of 
originary health and innocence. There was never a perfect balance that the haywire of 
human unruliness destroys. This is exactly why Zizek proclaims the superiority of 
Hegelian logic and dismisses Schelling's notion of the Absolute Indifference. The 
former does not need to posit a fantasy of original health because it can explain 
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everything through the restless movement of unsurpassable negativity. 
If the human subject is in some manner an irrevocable blockage in the vital 
fold of being, it must represent an amplification of an already existing potentiality in 
nature. We can see this in various forms - deformed animals, degenerative diseases, 
viruses, natural disasters, all of which point to ways in which the originary "harmony" 
of the world is predicated upon disorder, eruptive disarray, the inability to sustain itself 
in perfect symmetry. Here, one must think of the fundamental presupposition of 
Schellingian philosophy: If substance (God) were all, if from the very beginning there 
was nothing but a balanced movement, no subjectivity and no experience would be 
possible. Zizek has taken it upon himself to radicalize this insight by reactualizing the 
movement of the second draft through Hegelian dialectics and psychoanalysis, so that 
Schelling's brilliant metapsychological account of the emergence of the subject out of 
its pre-symbolic material Grund does not succumb to its theosophic tendencies. 
Zi:lek thus reconceptualizes and modifies Schelling's descriptions of the Past as 
that elusive X that forever haunts and precedes consciousness by modifYing its logical 
core. This has interesting implications. First, we must remember that at the level of 
logic Schelling's mythopoetic narrative of the Past does not primordially present a 
chronology of the Absolute. The "stages" Schelling refers to are logical and organized 
according to priority. Consequently, there is no sense in which the joyous nothingness 
temporally precedes the subject caught in the self-lacerating rage of matter. Yet, insofar 
as freedom exists, the abyss of freedom as pure potentiality - a freedom which is not yet 
posited - must be said to logically precede the rotation of drives that constitutes 
material being. Zizek follows the argument thus far, but then makes a crucial 
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modification. Insofar as the third element- the Entscheidung- demonstrates notional 
self-reflexivity, it retroactively institutes itself at the beginning of the entire process 
through the paradoxical causality of Freudian Nachtriiglichkeit (deferred 
action)/Lacanian apres-coup (after the fact). Freedom is not in direct contact with the 
Unground as that which neutrally grounds the conflict of the polar principles, nor is it a 
resurgence of the primordial Abyss of Freedom now in a higher exponent: it is the 
second usurping the position of the first and thus instituting a mere formal 
reconfiguration of the structure of the whole. Instead of an androgynous union of 
opposites, the negative becomes the essential core of the entire movement as Grund 
and existence become identified. Ziiek's reading tries to foreclose the possibility of a 
theosophic quaternity from within Schelling's text. 
There is, therefore, according to Zizek a truth hidden in Schelling's description 
of the passage from joyous nothingness to the all-consuming rage of the unfree 
subject. Insofar as there is no separation between substance and subject, the 
description of the joyous nothingness of non-experience and the infinite negativity of 
Todestrieb are, in essence, two sides of the same coin. The passage from one to the other 
is only a logical conversion.48 The ultimate paradox of the shift from the joyous 
nothingness of eternity (which Schelling refers to in the Freiheitsschrifl as the Ungrund, 
48 "Let us step back for a moment and reformulate the primordial contraction in terms of the passage 
from a self-contented Will which wants nothing to an actual Will which effectively wants something: 
the pure potentiality of the primordial Freedom - this blissful tranquillity, this pure enjoyment, of an 
unassertive, neutral Will which wants nothing - actualizes itself in the guise of a Will which actWe!J, 
iffectWe!J, wants this "nothing" - that is, the annihilation of every positive, determinate content. By 
means of this purely formal conversion of potentiality into actuality, the blissful peace of primordial 
Freedom thus changes into pure contraction, into the vortex of "divine madness" which threatens to 
swallow everything, into the highest affirmation of God's egotism which tolerates nothing outside of 
itself. In other words, the blissful peace of primordial Freedom and the all-destructive divine fury 
which sweeps away every determinate content are one and the same thing, only in a different 
modality - first in the mode of potentiality, then in the mode of actuality." (ID23) 
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the Ungrounded4~ to the Triebe of the Grund, which serves as the stepping stone to full-
fledged freedom, freedom as the predicate of a subject, is that there is no movement at all-
Grund is always-already the Ungrund, the ((closed" circle of nature is always already the scene of 
(possible full emergence qf) freedom. 50 The Ungrund is not a fourth principle which exists 
prior to Grund and existence as that which unifies them together as mutual pairs, but 
the radical self-relating negativity at the heart of the human subject, which now, 
instead of being a single part in the totality of material being, posits itself as such as an 
independent centre that hegemonically dominates the whole to which it belonged. 
The idea of nature as a harmonious Grund, a tranquil oscillation of forces 
caught within a blind necessity, is a fantasy: the beginning is not a solid, inert density, 
but a seething mass of heterogeneous matter lacking symmetry. The pure immanence 
of substance is not a permeating weave of positive being, a neverending sea whose 
fullness encompasses all: it is plagued by self-fragmentation. The libidinal frenzy of the 
unruliness of human nature does not merely represent a single case of the diseased 
breakdown of the ontological, but, rather, the inability of substance to posit itself as 
all. The "ground fails to ground" (ZO 92). Here we see the extremely Hegelian logic 
that Zizek superimposes over I extracts from Schelling in the second draft: it is the 
failure of the first moment (the self-positing of substance) which leads to the second 
(the unruliness of human nature, the unbearable instinctual short circuit of Triebe); the 
failure of the second leads to the third (the self-positing of this rupture in the fold of 
being). The essence of the third moment is, therefore, negation of the previous two, 
which gives it a notional self-relationality. In contrast to conservative orthodox 
49 See FS 276-277. 
50 SeeZO 92. 
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Hegelianism, the negation of the negation is not merely a return to affirmation, but an 
absolutization of the negative in the unsurpassability of its restlessness. 
In terms of Zizek's "reactualization" of Schelling, it is here that its most 
textually violent moment is located. It proclaims that the only way to save the 
Schellingian legacy is to say that nature as a full, rich creative potency inherent in the 
dark womb of the world is an illusion. Nature was always-already a sickly creature, 
whose collapse coincides with her conditions of (im)possibility. It is not only that 
nature never knew a moment of eternal happiness and joy, but that the dull, 
inarticulate pressure of her own gasping for breath (spirit, we remember, comes from 
the Latin spiritus, "breath," and is related to spirare, "to breathe") precedes the very 
positivity of her being. Substance can only be substance- nature can only be nature-
insofar as it is already internally torn apart by a constitutive moment of autolaceration 
that is the site of spirit/subject. This is why the passage is merely a "logical 
conversion" - it merely requires a certain gesture, an opening, to be brought to a new 
power, while nothing changes at the level of positive being. The idea of a unified, self-
penetrating substance only comes apres-coup as part of the imaginary 
reactive/retroactive reconstruction of reality, as part of a fundamental fantasy: 
True "anthropomorphism" resides in the notion of nature tacitly 
assumed by those who oppose man to nature: nature as a circular 
"return of the same," as the determinist kingdom of inexorable 
"natural laws," or (more in accordance with "New Age" sensitivity) 
nature as a harmonious, balanced Whole of cosmic forces derailed by 
man's hubris, his pathological arrogance. What is to be "deconstructed" 
is this very notion of nature: the features we refer to in order to 
emphasize man's unique status - the constitutive imbalance, the ~'out­
of-joint," on account of which man is an "unnatural" creature, "nature 
sick unto death" - must somehow be at work in nature itself, although-
as Schelling would have put it - in another, lower power (in the 
mathematical sense of the term). (ID 220) 
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In terms of the ontogenetic emergence of unruliness, this means that the 
material processes of nature were already broken, their rhythms disordered, uncertain, 
their circulation fragmented and unsteady. Within the passage from drive to desire, 
substance to subject, no positive content is added, nothing changes at the level of the 
Real qua Real; there is nothing but a parallax shift. The point is to articulate the 
radically constitutive material contingency that lies at the centre of the flux of the 
world. The immanent causality of nature is predicated upon its potential internal 
inconsistency and ontological breakdown. There is no constancy in the Real: nature is 
not a closed, harmonious system in the sense of following a fixed, all-pervading 
structural schemata. Its immanently-generated inconsistencies "entice" the gesture of 
the eruption of a space of self-relating negativity. Within its its self-torsion, something 
new - subjectivity - emerges as a glitch that gains its own self-actualizing autonomy 
within a relatively closed system of laws. 
But what remains even more radical in Ziiek is his reformulation of the 
unconscious through the Entscheidung. What Zizek focuses on is the very structure of 
the act itself, its activity as separating the Real into unconscious drives and phenomenal 
reality by repressing the Past and therefore creating the Present. Since the Entscheidung 
itself is that which originarily constitutes the conscious/unconscious distinction, Zizek 
argues that the fundamental breakthrough of the Weltalter is its demonstration that 
drives themselves are strictly speaking nonconscious. Since the conscious/unconscious 
distinction only occurs with the utterance of the Word (there cannot be aground 
without a grounded; prior to the grounded, tl1e ground cannot be posited as such and is 
merely a self-subsisting, semi-closed system of materiality), it would be philosophically 
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fallacious to call this energetic rotation of energy the unconscious proper. The result is 
that the Lacanian subject of the unconscious is radically non-coincident with both the 
id-forces of the body in its primary mode (the Real of Triebe can only be unconscious 
as a secondary effect after the self-positing of the unconscious act of scission as such) 
and the more-than-conscious matrix of the Symbolic (the self-generating play of 
language and culture can only emerge after the founding gesture that marks the 
beginning of transcendental self-reflexivity). 
This marks a challenge to conventional interpretations of Freud and Lacan, 
who respectively assert the unconscious as the biological movement of instinctual 
energy within the corpo-Real of the body and as the split between the subject of 
enunciation and the enunciating subject caused by the unpredictable reverberations of 
meaning within the infinite web of language, both of which have devastating effects on 
the imaginary orbit of phenomenological self-experience. For Zizek, one must 
presuppose a more primordial level of activity than the vital energetics of the body or 
the alienating effects of language that is the unconscious proper; an act which utilizes 
the libidinal frenzy of the Real of the human body, the unruliness which represents 
that implosion of instincts and therefore the negative void of nonbeing, in order to 
ground the possibility of the self-generation and self-proliferation of the automatic 
machinery of language. In this sense, Zizek's reactualization of the Schellingian 
unconscious is an attempt to sursume both the traditional Freudian and Lacanian 
accounts within a higher dialectical unity by showing their dependence on another 
more fundamental conceptual level. 
Zizek's controversial wager is that there is something more primordial within 
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Schelling's descriptions of the birth of the subject out of the utter twilight of pre-
personal being than an account of the self-transformation of "unconscious" spirit of 
nature towards the openness of self-revelation. Ziiek levels out the richness of the 
Schellingian account of nature to a material autopoesis that has nothing to do with the 
true seat of personality. What the Entscheidung proclaims is that there is no ontological 
interpenetration between nature as Grund and the subject of the unconscious, insofar 
as the Entscheidung usurps the position of the Grund through its own self-relating 
freedom: the former does not come close to establishing the unconscious proper 
because the unconscious is. never an evolutionary product subsumbable within the 
dynamic movement of natural history, but a radical activity of irreducible self-positing. 
Accordingly, to say the unconscious is an unknowingly creative subject synonymous 
with the mercurial womb of nature is false for the Lacanian subject on two accounts. 
Firstly, the subject of the unconscious can only emerge from the short circuit of 
instincts. There is no dialectically positWe relationship between the corpo-Real of the 
body (whether that be of an alchemical potency or libidinal dynamism in terms of the 
body's own self-organization and automatic processes) and phenomenal reality: the 
intuition behind the psychoanalytical experience shows the incommensurablity of 
nature (body) and culture (mind). One could therefore understand Zizek's project as an 
attempt to establish the ontological edifice implied by a structuralist metapsychology, 
which would presuppose the articulation of a rupturing event within being that 
alienates it to itself It is tl1is necessary self-sundering of substance (the scission of the 
Entscheidung) that precludes the possibility of the birth of light from darkness~ 1 there 
can be no internal reconfiguration of matter in order to bring forth some kind of 
51 This is another direct contradiction of Schelling. Cf .FS 239. 
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hidden potency because this would create the possibility of a Real as excess. Secondly, 
the birth of the unconscious is spontaneous, like a quantum fluctuation or a 
pathological symptom formation. It is a glitch. Yet, when it erupts, it restructures the 
very Real of the world in such a way that it hides from us its very abyssal origins as 
pure self-relating negativity 
Insofar as the annular oscillation of potencies only becomes the Grund of 
existence after the originary act of Entscheidung, the Real of drives becomes unconscious 
only in the aftermath of the very self-positing of the act of decision itsel£ 
Consciousness and the unconscious as the Real of drives both emerge in one magical 
brushstroke which retroactively creates their own evolutionary past by subsuming the 
ontogenetic prehistory of the subject (the emergence of desire in the flux of pure 
materiality) as part of its own self-effectuation through the paradoxical causality of 
Freudian Nachtriiglichkeit/the Lacanian apres-coup. 52 Here, however, we notice the Real as 
lack: the material ontogenetic origins of the subject become a mere retroactive posit 
that are in and of themselves never knowable or directly experienceable from within 
the differential network of language. Instead of exceeding and preceding the Symbolic and 
the Imaginary, it is only generated through their own immanent activity. Although the 
ontogenetic condition of desire (Real-as-excess) precedes and renders possible the self-
positing of the Entscheidung, the latter proves itself in a logical sense to be "superior" by 
"absorbing" it as part of its own free activity (Real-as-lack). In a paradoxical 
movement where temporally prior condition becomes an a posterior retroactive dfect, the 
self-unfolding causality of the universe is "torn apart" in the upsurge of freedom as 
self-relating negativity, which demands primordiality. It must be remembered, however, 
52 This is why Ziiek compares the act of decision to Baron Miinchhausen. See ID 19. 
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that this all occurs at the level of psychic reality (solipsistic notional self-reflexivity) and 
is therefore virtual. Yet, the Entscheidung can cause effects in the Real. This means that 
although the unconscious as act gains absolutely no positive being, the abyssal 
non being of the subject is able to modifY the fabric of reality in a way analogous to 
how language restructures the neuronal Real even if the differential network of 
signi:fiers does not exist "in the world." 
The primordial act that creates a wound that never heals in substance by 
separating Grund from existence is the unconscious proper for Zizek and is synonymous 
with the Lacanian subject. Although one might be tempted to read works such as 
Freiheitsschrifl, the Weltalter and Clara through the earlier Naturphilosophie, Zizek warns us 
from doing so. This would make us lose sight of what he takes to be the primordial 
originality, the premonition of a disruptive logic of transcendental materialism and its 
potential to reconceptualize the unconscious through Real-as-lack rather than Real-as-
excess. His claim is that, regardless of how, for example, Schelling may seem to say 
that nature as Grund is the unconscious, this interpretation would strictly speaking be in 
contradiction with the logic of the Entscheidung that he propounds. Even if nature is 
nevertheless a life-giving source of energy or an autopoesis and as such a more-than-
conscious activity that sets the stage for its autonomy, it must be again asserted that the 
energy that circulates through and sustains the very ontological fabric of the universe 
has nothing to do with the unconscious proper for Zi:lek. 
What should be taken, therefore, from the Weltalter is not just the ontogenetic 
account of the birth of the subject from the twilight of pre-personal being. Schelling's 
myth has a tendency to make us forget that the Grund, "this monstrous apparition with 
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hundreds of hands, this vortex that threatens to swallow everything, is a lure, a defence 
against the abyss of the pure act" (FA 70). Because freedom has no guarantee in 
objective being, a materialist articulation of the emergence of the unruly basis of the 
human subject overshadows the restlessness of the negative that posits itself through it. 
Even ontological collapse defers us from the true horror of subjectivity as solipsistic 
notional self-reflexivity that has no direct or necessary connection to the extra/pre-
subjective world. Focusing on the labyrinth of the pre-symbolic Real-as-excess, we 
forget the abyss of the Real-as-lack that stares us in the face. 
There is an element of undecidabiliry in the category of the Real in Ziiek. If he 
is to be faithful to Lacanian metapsychology, he must stick to the structuralist/idealist 
notion of the Real-as-lack and distance himself as much as possible from the notion of 
a reality that both precedes and exceeds our representations. Yet, in order to articulate 
the material basis of such a metapsychology, he must return to Schellingian ontology 
to describe the movement from the pre-symbolic Grund to the self-enclosed, solipsistic 
universe of human language. Insofar as this implies a contact to the Real-as-excess, 
there is an ambivalent oscillation between the two omnipresent in Zizek's work. 
Zi:lek highlights an irreconcilable contradiction. Even though the Real-as-lack 
is logically superior due to the unsurpassablity of the negative, in order to truly 
account for its existence we must rely on some access to a pre-subjective zone of 
experience. The shift from Real-as-excess to Real-as-lack is the ultimate parallax shift: 
it tries to designate the autodisruption of the noumenal Real-as-excess, how it becomes 
an impossible concept through its own immanent activity. Although the undecidability 
of the Real is a problem Zizek inherits from Lacan, he therefore remains forever true 
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to his great master's attempt to desubstantialize the Real. What clearly distinguishes 
Zizek's endeavour from Lacan's is that he refuses to take this desubstantization as a 
brute fact and instead inscribes it within the very activity of being. Substance 
desubstantializes itself through the extimate genesis of the Symbolic, which renders 
Substance inaccessible to itsel£ The question, however, is whether Zizek's account of 
this ontological "parallax" is philosophically consistent or even possible. It can only 
occur after it has emerged and the pre-symbolic Real is made impossible. 
What is potentially so problematic is Zizek's usage of Schelling to explain this 
process of autodisruption. The irreconcilable tension between Real-as-lack and Real-
as-excess is not a problem for Schelling. The positing of a fourth principle is meant to 
make possible non-reconcilable oppositions (Yes and No, Grund and existence) in a way 
that brings them beyond the level of pure binary antagonism and the paradox of 
purely formal negativity. What Zizek fails to consider is the precise position that 
Schellingian logic holds in terms of its relation to Hegel, a relation which Zi:lek's own 
parallax ontology in a certain sense radicalizes. Rightfully claiming that Schelling's 
later texts are a response to the incompletion of the triadic dialectic in Hegel's mature 
logic, he fails to see that the theosophic quaternity that Schelling develops is an 
attempt to correct Hegel's supposed shortcomings. For Schelling, Hegel fails because 
his Absolute Idealism is unable to account for a level of reality which is prior to the 
ideal. In Hegel's philosophy, the spectral of the real haunts the ideality of spirit just as 
it does in Zizek's. Schelling tries to solve this problem by saying the real can be ideal 
and the ideal real in the Ungrund. This tries to retain both the irreducible autonomy of 
the Hegelian movement of the purely logical negative and the activity of the real, their 
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productive and irremovable difference, without making the latter an impossible 
concept. Because opposites coincide in Absolute indifference, the limitations of the 
Real-as-lack are one with the surplus of the Real-as-excess as it presses itself upon us 
due to their point of metaphysical interpenetration. For Schelling, the suffering of 
negative determination (tarrying with the negative) is the joy of overwhelming 
ontological positivity (a saturating, world-shattering experience). 
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Conclusion 
The fundamental presupposition and guiding principle of Zizekian 
transcendental materialism is the Lacanian subject. What Zizek finds so compelling 
about Lacan is exactly this element of irreducible freedom upon which the 
psychoanalytical experience depends. The subject is always an indivisible remainder, 
something which protrudes out of all explanatory systems that attempt to contain it. 
This means that there is always something in man which is more than both his 
material and cultural determinations, something unpredictable because it is radically 
free. Ziiek's philosophy attempts to assert that we cannot be merely reduced to a place 
within the mere ebb and flow of matter (reductionist neurobiology), political 
ideological discourse (vulgar postmodern critiques of subjectivity) or dogmatic 
metaphysical systems of the world (everything has its reason within a self-totalizing 
activity) because all fail to come to terms with the ultimate irreducibiliry of human 
activity in the technical sense that. Zizek bestows upon it The claim is that only an 
ontology that is able to think the contradiction between system and freedom will be 
adequate to give us a satisfYing account of reality. Instead of being based on self-
enclosure and totalizing absolutes, Zizek therefore tries to make it so that the very 
vitality of his system is sustained and conditioned by the rupture, breakdown, and 
non-coincidence of its own logical fold. Yet, it refuses to view this element of 
metaphysical collapse as a mere failure of substance to ground itself: the short 
circuiting of a closed, deterministic system is the space for the emergence of freedom. 
Zizek searches for the productive power latent in the very self-contortion of system, 
the positive theoretical potential in ontological parallax and irrevocable, self-positing 
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negativity in the heart of being. 
This is why in Zizek's work we find such an emphasis on the "traumatic" core 
of subjectivity, the "unbearable agony" of freedom, or the "unruly excess" of life at 
the basis of human ipseity. The freely self-relating negativity that is the subject always 
threatens to erupt at any second and internally devastate the coordinates of everyday 
reality in all of its determinations. Zizek finds freedom "monstrous" because it does 
not obey the principle of sufficient reason. It ruptures and immanently shatters any 
attempt to enclose it. The only way we can experience it in the fullness of its 
primordiality is as madness - the groundless can only appear as a "trauma" within 
phenomenal experience because it founds a new order and thereby restructures the 
whole of reality in an unpredictable manner. Freedom, if it is to be irreducibly free, 
must be formally identical to evil: it cannot be subordinated to a higher dialectical 
standpoint, but must be irreducibly self-assertive and self-grounding, arising from 
within itself and not in relation to any external determination. As the founding gesture 
of order itself, it must remain orderless; as soon as it is given a ground, it fails to be 
free. Here we see the specifically Schellingian character of Zizek's philosophy. 
Zizek is only able to guarantee such a conception of freedom through a new 
form of materialism in which the pure "I" receives its freedom from immanent 
ontological breakdown. ZiZek's reading and appropriation of the Grundlogik of 
German Idealism has such a transcendental materialism as its goal, because he sees 
premonitions of it within various gestures within the post-Kantian attempt to think 
through the abyss of freedom constitutive of the subject, premonitions which only 
become truly visible retroactively after the advent of psychoanalysis. Yet, there is a 
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problem which arises out of Zizek's uncertain hybridism of Schellingian ontology and 
Hegelian logic, a problem which internally threatens to destabilize the conceptual 
structure of Zizek's transcendental materialism. Although Zizek's "mutual buggering" 
of both Schelling and Hegel creates a perhaps uncannily consistent philosophical 
whole, it, perhaps unwittingly, draws our attention to an ambivalent and perhaps 
irreconcilable oscillation between the Real as lack and the Real as excess. This 
ambiguity lies at the core of the Lacanian subject and points to the intrinsic limitations 
of Lacanian psychoanalysis as a scientific explanatory system of the psyche. 
Within the Lacanian registers, the Real appears necessarily as a lack. As soon 
as the Symbolic emerges as a self-replicating, self-evolving differential system, which 
transcendentally constitutes the phenomenal world of experience, any direct contact 
with the Real is precluded. The Lacanian thesis is a variation of structuralist linguistic 
idealism. It is not only that concepts do not need to coincide with objects. The 
ciphering of the Real means that signification has nothing to do with objective reality in 
itself: signifiers only participate in an endless chain of self-relation which precludes 
access to the "outside" world. 53 There is no realist epistemology possible within 
structural linguistics for Lacan because the link between signifier and extra-linguistic 
object is cut. 
Whatever the Real is in itself prior to language remains essentially unknowable. 
The Real is an impossible concept which we nevertheless have to posit in order to 
account for the condition of the (im)possibility of language. Yet Lacan goes to great 
lengths to distance his conception of the Real from the Kantian noumenon because of 
53 See Lacan, "Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter"' in Ecnts, trans. Bruce Fink ( ew York: W W 
Norton & Company, 2006), p. 6-50. Bruce Fink gives a marvellous recapitulation and analysis of 
ciphering in Chapter Two, "The Nature of Unconscious T hought, or How the Other Half 
'Thinks,"' in 1m Lacanian Subject (New York: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 14-23. 
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the latter's implied metaphysical commitment to a full, complete-unto-itself reality that 
precedes and exceeds the schematic categories of language and understanding. The 
notion of noumenon posits the Real as excess in a manner disagreeable to Lacan 
insofar as it assumes that extrasubjective reality is the cause of our representations. 
The pre-subjective Real, therefore, becomes a mere illusionary construct necessary to 
sustain the internal consistency of the symbolic system. 
Ziiek's philosophy, however, is more than linguistic idealism. As Adrian 
Johnston has clearly shown, Zizek's philosophy must be conceived as an attempt to 
give a purely materialist ontogenetic account of the subject. Without some account the 
emergence of the subject out of its pre-symbolic ground, Lacan's whole project would 
be theoretically void. Yet, it is clear that, insofar as the Real can only appear as lack 
within the colonizing activity of language, the subject is necessarily lost in some sort of 
linguistic idealism. Zizek tries to break out of the correlationist circle of the differential 
system of language to show how its requires a materialist grounding. Johnston's 
formulation of the problematic is useful here: "materialism ... formulates itself vis-a-vis 
the deadlocks internal to radical transcendental idealism. On this account, materialism 
is philosophically tenable only as the spectral inverse of idealism, accompanying it as 
the shadow cast by idealism's insurmountable incompleteness" (ZO 19). But this does 
not suffice. The immanent "breakdowns" of this solipsistic self-enclosure, which 
represent the inability of the subject to posit itself as a self-sufficient, autocratic all, 
only point to a negative experience of the Real. "Extimacy" is still formally an idealist 
lack, a conceptual non-coincidence: it is unclear how this notional obstruction, an 
internal hindrance to the self-positing of subjectivity, can serve as a foundation for a 
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new materialist metaphysics of the absolute. 
Even if the pre-symbolic Grund can only show itself negatively through an 
internal pressure that explodes the ideal from within, and never in the fullness of its 
being an indivisible remainder, Ziiek nevertheless attempts to explain the genesis of a 
structuralist self-enclosed system that prevents our direct engagement with the Real. 
His fundamental thesis is that our inability to grasp the thing in itself is already that 
which we are searching for: the limitation of linguistic idealism is inherent to reality 
itself, inscribed within the fold of being, so that substance is radically non-coincident 
with itsel£ The difficulty is that, since he admits that Schelling is able to 
mythopoetically describe the movement from material drives to the Symbolic and 
draws upon this for his own theory of the subject, he appears to assert that an 
immediate proximity to the Real, instead of its shadow, is philosophically tenable, that 
is, that is not rendered impossible by the ciphering activity of language and only 
approachable negatively through its immanent breakdown. But this seems inconsistent 
with the basic presuppositions of Lacanian psychoanalysis. The implication is that, 
even if Schelling had to resort to language in order to express the ontologico-
foundational basis of human experience, not only is an experience of the pre-symbolic 
Real possible in itself in Schelling's view, but we can reach it through language. For 
Schelling the proto-structuralist, Hegelian Real as lack must ultimately open up unto 
and be surpassed by a pure ontology of the Schellingian Real, the indivisible 
remainder, that which precedes and exceeds the Symbolic and the Imaginary. But Ziiek's 
Lacanian commitments make it impossible to develop such an ontology and it is 
uncertain how he can balance his own radical idealism with materialism. His attempt 
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to inscribe the former within the latter, to make the epistemic limitations of linguistic 
idealism synonymous with being's non-coincidence to self, only intensifies the problem: 
how is the subject able to step outside of its own self-enclosed differential system to 
describe such a parallax movement from materialism to solipsistic idealism? 
A further difficulty with Zizek work is its uncertain relation to Lacanian 
orthodoxy. In some ways, Zizek can be interpreted as overstepping Lacan's attempt to 
conserve the equivalency of the registers. Zizek asserts that focusing on Lacan's 
famous mottos such as "the unconscious is structured like a language" only covers up a 
more primordial conceptual level of the subject. Yet, Ziiek's own thinking is not a 
radical rupture with Lacan by any means, insofar as the later Lacan himself points to 
the need to develop a philosophy of nature consistent with the psychoanalytical 
subject. In the seventh seminar Lacan gestures towards the barring the Real to show 
that substance as not-all is a necessary ontological implication of the psychoanalytical 
experience.54 But if the Real is only lack, and the essential link between signifier and 
transcendent, extra-linguistic signified is cut, how can Lacan make such a statement? 
Where does this "direct touching" of the Real come from? 
The problem appears to lie at the heart of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Ziiek 
himself is often inconsistent in his own descriptions of the Real. Although most of his 
comments on Schelling bespeak the theoretical possibility and necessity of the Real as 
excess, other descriptions of the Real focus almost explicitly on it as lack. His 
discussions of the night of the world in the Ticklish Subject, for instance, have a 
tendency to treat the Real as the other side of transcendental imagination, hence as a 
54 See Lacan, Le shninaire, Livre XVI!l· L'envers de la psyclwanalyse, 1969-1970, ed.J acques-Alain Miller. 
(Paris: Seuil, 1991), p. 36. 
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logical rather than an ontological concept, although the notion clearly has 
metaphysical reach. Zizek relates it to the Kantian conception of unruliness, the 
irremovable In-between that makes the conventional Hegelian dialectical triad 
incomplete. Other categories that ZiZek extracts from Hegel show why he has a 
preference for Hegel over Schelling and allow us to pinpoint what exactly radically 
differentiates Zizek's transcendental materialism from German Idealism while 
illustrating the internal ambiguities of the former. 
The Hegelian concept "tarrying with the negative," for instance, is essentially 
the Real as lack. It emerges from Hegel's own critique and extension of the Kantian 
noumenon as a necessary limit-concept. For Hegel, the theoretical posit is superfluous. 
Objects as they are in themselves give themselves to consciousness; there is no inner 
core that is hiding. This becomes most evident in the experience of non-coincidence 
between our concepts and that which they represent. Within the inconsistency of the 
immanent structure of knowledge, the object in itself shows itself through the form of 
a negative determination which burdens experience. Its positivity is hidden within its 
shadow, but this can only be brought fourth, posited, retroactively, in a modification of 
the concepts that constitute the mediation of the world in such a manner that the 
original paradox or blockage disappears. What so interests ZiZek here is the necessity 
of what Hegel describes as "looking the negative in the face." Not only does it link 
Hegel to concepts such as Todestrieb,55 but more importantly there is no "intuited 
excess," no "pure exteriority" that we come up against in experience; even this 
55 "Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is of all things the most dreadful, and to 
hold fast what is dead requires the greatest strength .... But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks 
from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures and maintains 
itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself." Hegel, Phmommology of 
SpiriJ, trans. A. V. Miller (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 19. 
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"otherness" is created through the activity of spirit, so that it only shows itself as the 
immanent lack or kink within the symbolic order. There is no need for a direct contact 
with the extra-ideal world because everything happens within the self-enclosure and 
internalized pressure of the logical movement of the Symbolic. 
It is at this juncture that we see the immediate problem that Slavoj Ziiek's 
reactualization of German Idealism presents to Lacanian psychoanalysis. Insofar as 
Zizek relies on Schelling's account of the movement from the pre-symbolic Real to the 
universe of human meaning, he assumes some kind of direct contact with pre-
subjective reality. We do not just "tarry with the negative"; we come up against the 
Real in its "fullness," not its "lack" through the negative contortion and internal 
obstruction of idealist representation. The X that evades consciousness, the centre-
piece of Schelling's thought, is never a mere formal limit: it is an attempt to express 
the subject-independent interiority of nature to which we have access despite the 
mediating activity of consciousness. Schelling refuses to separate this ontological in-
itself of precognitive or extra-symbolic reality from the epistemological sphere of 
idealist representations: the two must be intimately connected if philosophy is to be 
well founded, which implies a dialectically positive interchange between mind and 
matter as a complex identity in difference. Yet, Lacan's structuralist metapsychology 
prohibits such a move because this requires that the chain of signification that 
constitutes human language is not based on an infinitely self-referential closed system. 
It would suggest that we are primordially connected with nature at some pre-symbolic 
level of experience, that the subject is not a dialectically non-sursumable in-between 
that exists as the psychotic withdrawal of nature into Self as the guarantee of the 
86 
solipsistic self-enclosure of the Symbolic. 
It is also, perhaps, for this reason that Zizek separates himself from the mature 
Hegelian triad of Logic, Nature and Spirit, seeing Hegel's description of the passage 
to culture as ultimately dissatisfying because it suggests a complete return of the idea 
to itsel£ What this means is that if nature is spirit, there is no disjunctive parallax 
between the two; insofar as the categories of thinking are simultaneously the 
metaphysical categories of the world, the core of the psychoanalytical experience as 
infinite, constitutive conflict between mind and body is precluded. This is why, for 
Hegel, the deadlock of linguistic idealism does not emerge: if the ideal is not a mere 
"cipher," but is in some sense nature or the Absolute speaking itself, the real and the 
ideal are a dialectical self-differentiating unity in difference. The real, subject-
independent world can only show itself in the immanence of ideality, but it is raising 
itself up into self-conscious. For Zi:lek, this means that the gaze of the subject cannot 
be in any sense external to substance, but must be an internal reflection of its being 
upon itsel£ But insofar as this reflection is predicated upon an irrevocable moment of 
ontological catastrophe which forever alienates substance from itself, the entire 
Grundlogik of German Idealism as an attempt to rethink the subject-object relation 
internally collapses. The Absolute can only open its eyes to gaze upon itself through 
an ontological parallax which traps it within psychotic misrecognition. 
The problem here is two-fold. Firstly, if the entire conceptual framework of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis is dependent upon a notion of the Real as lack and its 
concomitant concept of the infinite dichotomy between mind and body, arry 
ontogenetic history of the emergence of the psychoanalytical subject must be a mere 
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retroactive posit. One can never gain knowledge of the material origins of subjectivity 
because there is absolutely no point of positive contact, no place of conjuncture, 
between the real and the ideal. The freedom of the Symbolic is based on the fact that 
it can cipher the Real arbitrarily according to its own internal logic; it does not depend 
upon some kind of pres-symbolic engagement or immersion in extrasubjective reality. 
This precludes a theoretical explanation of the emergence of the psychoanalytical 
subject. Secondly, if Zizek's metapsychology is to be an advancement towards the 
explication of the obscure origins of the subject, Zizek needs to admit some level of 
primordial contact with the Real as that which precedes and exceeds the Symbolic and the 
Imaginary, either in a traditionally Hegelian or Schelling manner. Yet this very 
possibility suggests that the psychoanalytical experience cannot be one of infinite 
conflict between mind and body, the real and the ideal. There must be a point of 
dialectical union, a place where they touch and are interpenetrated, a point of 
indifference. The dilemma is the following: if, in order to article the materialist 
ontogenesis of the subject, his own radical idealism has to be qualified so that there is 
some primordial proximity with a substantial, subject-independent Real, then Zizek's 
own attempt to prioritize the Lacanian unconscious over other modes must be 
rethought. His dependance on Schelling's philosophy brings to the fore other 
conceptual possibilities for understanding the nature of subjectivity and the relation of 
mind to nature than the purely negative, even psychotic one, emphasized by Lacan, 
conceptual possibilities that Zizek attempts to foreclose through the development of 
his own parallax ontology. 
This central undecidability is becoming even more noticeable in Zizek's latest 
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works. In the Fragile Absolute, for example, we see an unavoidable oscillation between 
the unsurpassable superiority of Real-as-lack, the self-enclosed system of language, 
and the necessity of the Real-as-excess. In Chapter 6 "The Fantasmatic Real," Zizek 
goes to great lengths to interpret Schelling's descriptions of the Grund in terms of the 
Freudian myth of the primal father. This means that, in essence, the event of the 
Entscheidung that violendy separates Grund from existence never occurred: it is a 
fantasmatic, retroactive posit. Therefore, Schelling's "obscurantist idealist" manner of 
"deducing" the act from the pre-symbolic is only true insofar as it gestures towards the 
fundamental horror of subjectivity, just as the empirically false statements of those 
suffering false memory syndrome (child sexual abuse) reveal the deadlock haunting a 
patient (the inability to come to terms with the infinite deferral of desire). What is 
clear from this new spin on Ziiek's earlier interpretation of Schelling is Zizek's attempt 
to distance himself from any notion of a substantial Real outside of the self-positing of 
the act and its concomitant solipsistic ciphering of reality. But then in the next chapter 
"Why Is The Truth Monstrous?" Ziiek discuses the constitutive element of the 
shadow of originary "untruth" in Heideggerian ontology. Following Heidegger, he 
speaks of this "untruth" as the primordial thickness of the forest that comes before all 
clearings. In an interesting move given his previous demeaning of the Schellingian 
position, he identifies this necessary level of "imponderability" with the pre-subjective 
Real, as that which exceeds, precedes and even constitutes the condition of the 
possibility of Symbolic and the Real-as-lack. Yet, he goes even one step further. 
In order to account for the emergence of his clearing, Zizek shows how 
Heidegger needs to have recourse towards the notion of "ontological derangement" in 
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his Bdtriige zur Philosophie, an originary reversal in the order of being where man asserts 
himself over the totality of the whole. What is the most revealing for Zizek is that the 
creation of this concept, which he identifies as structurally identical to Todestrieb and 
diabolic evil, coincides perfecdy with Heidegger's intensive reading of Schelling's 
Frdhdtsschrifl. Linking Heidegger's notion of the imponderable thickness of untruth 
that surrounds every disclosive clearing to the pre-symbolic Real, Zizek demonstrates 
that, despite his previous disavowal of Schelling's description of the emergence of this 
derangement as just a "lure," it must nevertheless be paradoxically expressive of an 
underlying metaphysical, pre-/extrasubjective truth: one must understand "the 
emergence of the symbolic Order as the answer to some monstrous excess in the Real" 
through the description of the genesis of ontological perversion that precedes and 
exceeds the symbolic structures which it renders possible (FA 83). In only a couple 
pages of the same text Ziiek oscillates irreconcilably between the Real-as-excess as a 
necessary fantasmatic narrative with no claim to objective truth (like the Freudian 
myth) and as an ontological phenomenon the description of which is fundamental to 
our understanding of psychoanalysis. 
In this sense, we can see why Zizek is perhaps so selective in his reading of 
German Idealism. He knows that what we see in the wake of post-Kantian idealism is 
not limited to a logic which renders possible human freedom through a metaphysical 
short circuit. System and freedom are not necessarily ontological "parallaxes": the 
relation between free spirit and the material body is a one of mutual interaction and 
dialectical interpenetration, possibly emerging out of a creative and ontologically rich 
natural teleology. Because Ziiek's philosophy claims that the psychoanalytical 
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experience of discord is irreducible, he merely dismisses the idea of a properly 
speaking dialectical materialism based on a positive interplay between mind and body. 
The problem is not necessarily the emergence of the gap that holds them in relative 
independence from one another, but their dialectical identity in difference, how body 
is mind (which, as Schelling says, is not an identification but a statement of dynamic 
logic56). 
But we must ask ourselves about the very nature of the Real in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. Are the Real-as-excess and the Real-as-lack necessarily irreconcilable? 
If the former is possible, does this mean that other interpretations of Lacan are 
possible too? If, as Ziiek at some places suggests, the Real as Grund is only an another 
fantasmatic attempt to save us from a realization of the true horror of subjective 
experience, how are we to interpret his own endeavour to develop a metapsychological 
account of the emergence of the subject? How can we explain the ontogenetic 
preconditions which possiblize the unconscious act if the Real as excess is merely an 
illusion? Rather than providing Lacan with a solid metaphysical foundation, Zizek's 
reactualization of German Idealism intensifies the conceptual paradoxes underlying 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
56 See FS 223-225. 
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